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ASSEMBLY BILL 2223 (MOORE) --- PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT ISSUES

On Tuesday, December 17, the Senate Local Government Committee held an interim hearing on Assembly Bill 2223 by Assemblywoman Gwen Moore, relating to the Permit Streamlining Act.
Four state senators heard attorneys, planners, lobbyists, and
citizen activists explore the relationship between the Permit
Streamlining Act and the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA). The Committee members also heard the witnesses describe other problems with the Permit Streamlining Act.
The four Committee members who attended the hearing were:
Senator
Senator
Senator
Senator

Marian Bergeson, Chairman
Ruben s. Ayala, Vice Chair
Charles M. Calderon
Newton R. Russell

In addition, Assemblywoman Gwen Moore, author of AB 2223,
joined the Senators to explore these issues.
The hearing began at 1:45 p.m. and finished at 4:45 p.m.
About 30 people attended the hearing in the State Capitol.
This summary report contains the Committee staff's explanations of what happened at the hearing (the white pages), reprints the briefing paper that the staff wrote for the Committee (the blue pages), and reproduces the written materials
that the witnesses and others submitted (the yellow pages).
STAFF FINDINGS

Any attempt to distill an entire afternoon's discussion and
dialogue into a few findings glosses over important details.
But after carefully reviewing the oral testimony and written
presentations, the Committee's staff identified these key
findings:
•

The deemed approved provision of the Permit
Streamlining Act is not working.

•

Project applicants are dissatisfied because the
Act does not deliver the certainty it seemed to
promise.

•

Public officials are dissatisfied because the
deadlines are too rigid and they lose the power
to mitigate problems.

•

citizens are dissatisfied because they suffer
when public officials miss the deadlines.

-
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•

Despite their common dissatisfaction, applicants, officials, and citizens can't agree on
the way to harmonize the deadlines of the Permit
Streamlining Act and CEQA.

•

However, there is growing interest in "tolling"
the Permit Streamlining Act's deadline until the
CEQA process is finished.

•

Besides deadlines, other problems exist and reforms are possible.
THE WITNESSES

Ten people spoke at the Committee's hearing. Seven of them
submitted written comments which appear in the yellow pages.
Robert E. Merritt•
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen
Franklin P. Eberhard*
Los Angeles City Planning Department
Bill Christopher•
People for Livable and Active Neighborhoods in Los Angeles
(PLAN-LA)
Debra L. Bowen•
Coastal Area Support Team (COAST)
Sherman L. Stacey•
Attorney for stephen M. Blanchard
Darryl Young
Sierra Club
Ernest Silva*
League of California Cities
Dwight Hansen
California Building Industry Association
James P. Corn
California Council of Civil Engineers and Land Surveyors
James G. Moose•
Remy & Thomas

(* = See the written material reprinted in the yellow pages]
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In addition,
Committee.

wrote to the
low pages.

John Powers,
Conner, and
Coastal Area Support Team (COAST)

L. Bowen

Honorable Ruth Galanter
Los Angeles City Councilwoman
Jackie Freedman, Laura Lake, and
Friends of Westwood, Inc.

0 1 Brien

LEGISLATORS• INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
senator Bergeson opened the hearing by concentrating the
islators' attention on the central policy question: "what is
the relationship between the deadlines in the Permit Streamlining Act and the California Environmental Quality Act?"
The Senator reminded the witnesses that her Committee is "not
here to judge whether the city of Los Angeles bent or broke
the law in its handling of the 1 601 Ocean Front Walk' project." Instead, she urged the Committee to focus on the
policy implications of that case.
"We need to think about
how the one-year deadline in CEQA for finishing an EIR should
fit with the Permit Streamlining Act's one-year deadline for
acting on projects."
Assemblywoman Moore thanked the Committee for taking time to
study her AB 2223 and to sort out the relationship between
the two statutes. Her intent is to find a way that the CEQA
and Permit Streamlining Act processes can "run concurrently."
Public officials need to consider environmental issues when
they approve permits.
She challenged the witnesses to balance the rights of property owners with the general public
welfare.
11

THE DREAM AND THE REALITY"

The Committee's lead witness was San Francisco attorney
Robert E. Merritt, an editor of the Land Use Forum and author
of "The Permit Streamlining Act: The Dream and the Reality."
Rather than advocating a particular view, Merritt served the
Committee as an expert policy advisor.
Drawing from his recent article (reprinted in the blue pages) , Merritt outlined
a brief history of the Permit Streamlining Act and its two
stages: the application stage and the deemed approval stage.

4 -

Merritt then sketched "four major problems" which he claimed
"prevent the Permit Streamlining Act from accomplishing the
objective of speedy processing of land use entitlements."
•

The Act does not apply to legislative actions.

e

There can be no deemed approval under the Act unless
the project is consistent with underlying

e

The Act may fail constitutional due process requirements because it does not provide for hearings.

e

If deemed approval occurs, it still is not clear
exactly what has been approved.

Turning to the relationship between the Permit Streamlining
Act and CEQA, Merritt reviewed the two statutes' time deadlines. He conceded that "it is quite easy" to reach the
deemed approval deadline without having a completed EIR. To
avoid this perverse result, Merritt described three possible
alternatives to the Committee.
First, the Legislature could declare that without a cer11
tified EIR, a project cannot be deemed approved.
AB 2223
says this in no uncertain terms."
Second, the Legislature could impose a "real" one-year
deadline on the preparation of an EIR and allow a project to
be deemed approved even if the agency is not yet completed.
Third, the Legislature could suspend ("toll") the deemed
approval until 45 days after the agency completes
CEQA
process.
Merritt noted that his article suggests the third alternative
as a solution to a similar situation involving legislative
actions. At the end of the hearing, Merritt explained the
Legislature's alternatives and described four other problems
with the statute; see pages 8 and 9.
DEEMED APPROVED
The key struggle in what John Powers called the "disharmony"
between the Permit streamlining Act and CEQA is the deemed
approved provision.
"It's time to reconsider the Permit
Streamlining Act," asserted Ernie Silva, acknowledging the
continuing conflict between the two statutes. To Silva, the
deemed approved provision moots CEQA's requirements for environmental balancing.
Landowners' constitutional rights may be at risk if a deemed
approved project proceeds without a public hearing, said Jim
Moose. The constitutional defect overshadows other problems.

- 5 -

For Frank Eberhard,
izens their
political access to
lows projects to
avoid the usual
and exactions.
Debra Bowen agreed, arguing
provision imposes a penalty
, not on the
public agency which missed the statutory
The most
controversial projects take the longest to review, she said,
but they are the most likely to be deemed approved. Perhaps
the Legislature should replace the deemed approved provision
with the ability to reverse a poor decis
Ernie
Silva.
Darryl Young told the legislators that there should be no
automatic approval of any project
would rather not
have any statutory deadlines. Responding to senator Bergeson, Young conceded that he did not have a solution to completing projects in a timely manner.
Postponing the deemed approval until after an agency completes its CEQA process would mean "no automatic approval at
all" under the Permit Streamlining Act, according to Jim
Corn. The Legislature addressed the Act to governments that
fail to act, said Dwight Hansen. So eliminating the deemed
approved provision would gut the statute's impact.
More discussion on t

limits and deadlines appears below.

For cities the
ze of Los Angeles, Frank Eberhard contended
that the Permit Streamlining Act's 11 time limits are too
stringent" for controversial or complex projects. When
Senator Bergeson asked if state law needed "more explicit
deadlines," Eberhard said, "Not really." A better approach
is for the Legislature to "set a timeline after the EIR is
done to approve the project." Assemblywoman Moore observed
that Eberhard's approach "delays the process" because there
would be no final deadline for
Bill Christopher expla
that to
these deadlines,
Los Angeles city officials
an application
complete (under the Permit Streamlining Act until
CEQA
process has been completed. senator Bergeson responded by
reemphasizing her commitment to the principle that there
"should be a time when everything is certain." Senator Ayala
agreed. Debra Bowen said that having a "stringent deadline
for completing the CEQA process also ignores the reality that
the larger a project, and the more adverse its impacts, the
longer the CEQA review takes." Bowen suggested that AB 2223
include a defined time limit for CEQA review or allow the developer and the agency to decide together what a feasible
deadline should be.

After offering the
lators a chart showing both Acts'
time deadlines, Ernie Silva sa
that "existing time limits
can be unworkable." Silva's testimony sliced the one-year
deadline into its component parts, showing how little time
local staffers have to review proposed projects. A one-year
timeline works for less controversial projects, Silva said.
The problem comes with the more complicated proposals.
Senator Calderon observed that the Legislature should not
slow down the process just to let cities catch up.
If there
are deadline problems, "maybe we should have arbitrators decide" these cases.
"Cities want to approve projects" because they want development, Silva said. City officials find it "tough" to be
caught between "the NIMBYs" and the developers.
senator
Russell noted that "if you're the person paying the bills,"
even a one-year deadline "is a long time. 11
The statutory analysis by Jim Moose exposed the legislators
to several different conflicting interpretations of these
deadlines.
But emphasizing the importance of the statutory deadlines,
Sherman Stacey reminded the legislators of the bipartisan
support that accompanied the 1977 passage of the Permit
Streamlining Act.
In signing the bill, Stacey reported that
Governor Jerry Brown said that the Act's one-year deadline
"helps guarantee that every proposed development receives a
prompt and fair hearing." The result, Stacey said, is that
11
99% of all projects meet the time deadlines of the Act." Of
course, timetable will be viewed differently from each s
added Dwight Hansen.
Because of "judicial disfavor," Jim Corn acknowledged that
automatic approvals are "not terribly efficacious. 11 However,
he does not favor their repeal because the threat of an automatic approval "still has sufficient validity to convince
some agencies to act within the time limits." Rather than
repeal the deadlines, Corn wanted reforms.
CEQA and the Permit Streamlining Act should "run concurrently and be consistent."
He wanted the Legis
to:
•
Cut the basic deadline from one year to six months
with the opportunity for one additional six-month extension.
Corn argued that the current one-year deadline makes every
project a one-year effort.
• Require the agency to refund the applicant's processing fees if the agency violates the statutory time limits.
Faced with lost revenues, public officials will pay attention
to deadlines.
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proved
ficia
mitigation
noted
City of Los
the 601 Ocean
chance when

Bill Christopher, Debra
the absence of findings
Ernie Silva said that
ject is deemed approved
come after the
When Assemblywoman Moore
solved if agencies took mit
started, Frank Eberhard explained
process was necessary
identify
to explore the
mitigat

of an
ile" because it
reproject
and

Testimony from Jim Moose explained the situation behind
Patterson v. City of Sausalito, a
1
in
which
represents
City. The
project was deemed
precisely
proposed by the
fact
EIR showed that
mental
could have
the court had allowed
measures.
One remedy,
woman Moore•s
dard cond
cations.

stanapplibe," he asserted.

Bob Merritt
the
ling as a
to
ize
both Acts. The Legislature could "suspend the deemed approval until a fixed time elapses (e.g. 45 days) after the
CEQA process is
ete," Merritt suggested.
Frank Eberhard agreed with
alternative of tolling but
suggested a 60-day time limit. Bill Christopher and Ernie
Silva acknowledged that tolling was one alternative to the
current conflict between the Acts. Debra Bowen told the
Committee that AB 2223 a
infers a variation on the
tolling option by
ies to finish their CEQA
documents before act
underlying proposal.
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SOME FINAL WORDS OF ADVICE
As the hearing closed, Senator Bergeson invited Bob Merritt
to provide the Committee with more general advice on the Permit Streamlining Act. Merritt began by noting that the
ed approved concept probably seemed "quick and efficient" to
legislators when it was first enacted in 1977. But the concept has become "complicated and proven unworkable."
Merritt then suggested dropping the deemed approval provision
in favor of other approaches:
•
Quick court action. Merritt's first alternative was
a summary judicial proceeding.
If an agency misses its deadline, the developer could ask the court for 11 a preemptory
writ of mandate directing the agency to act on the application." The Act could lay out the necessary legal tools and
forms to speed its implementation. The court could act on
written pleadings, without oral argument. The order could be
"non-appealable." Successful applicants could recover their
attorneys' fees and possibly even damages if "the agency
acted capriciously."
According to Merritt, the key is a judicial remedy that is:
1.
2.
3.

Limited to a single issue (the deadline).
Readily available.
Results in cost to the agency for dragging its feet.

•
With hearings. Terming it "more moderate proposal,"
Merritt offered a second alternative that followed the first
suggestion but required a hearing.
But, he conceded, if the
agency does not act after the hearing, the current difficulties still remain.
•
Legislative vs. adjudicatory. Merritt's third suggestion was to eliminate the distinction between legislative
and adjudicatory decisions. The Act could require agencies
to impose deadlines on their legislative decisions if they
apply to specific locations; e.g., site-specific rezoning requests.
•
Other improvements.
Contending that it is possible
to streamline the Streamlining Act, Merritt offered a series
of specific changes to improve the implementation of the
statute:

*
*

*
*

Standard cover page for
Eliminate the hazardous
Standard submittal when
Standard conditions for

applications.
waste statement.
requirements are missing.
deemed approved projects.

Merritt concluded
be simpler
the
cess. 11 But ever
this "is
ect

would
prothat
11

NOTE: I could not have prepared this summary report without
the help of my colleagues Dave
ff and Jen Hilger. I needed
their help at a very difficult time. I am very grateful.
- Peter Detwiler
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ASSEMBLY BILL 2223 {MOORE): PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT ISSUES
On July 17, the Senate Local Government Committee postponed
action on Assemblywoman Gwen Moore's Assembly Bill 2223. on
a motion made by Senator Newton Russell, the Committee voted
5-0 to hold AB 2223 for further study during the Legislature's interim recess.
Senator Marian Bergeson, the Committee's Chairman, has called a hearing on AB 2223 for Tuesday
afternoon, December 17.
AB 2223 IN SUMMARY
Assembly Bill 2223 says that a development permit shall be
"deemed approved" under the Permit Streamlining Act only if
the public agency has complied with the California Environmental Quality Act.
The bill's text appears in Appendix A.
To understand the bill, legislators must also know that:

•
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
requires public officials to review projects' environmental effects before they act.
•
Environmental impact reports (EIRs) must be
ready within one year.
•
The Permit Streamlining Act requires officials
to act on development projects within one year.
•
If officials fail to act within a year, the Permit Streamlining Act says that a project is "deemed
approved."
•
The "deemed approved" provision of the Permit
Streamlining Act does not apply to EIRs.
•
Los Angeles City officials agreed that permits
for a Venice mini-mall were deemed approved even
though they had not completed the CEQA process.
•
Assemblywoman Moore introduced AB 2223 to prevent this situation from happening again.
Briefing paper. To prepare state legislators and the witnesses for their December 17 discussions, this staff briefing
paper explains:
1. The origins and workings of the California Environmental
Quality Act and the Permit Streamlining Act.
2.

How the courts have interpreted these laws.

3. The specific situation in Los Angeles that prompted
Assemblywoman Moore to introduce her bill.

The briefing paper then frames the central policy question
and offers three alternative answers.
In addition, this
paper contains two appendices:
Appendix A is the text of Assembly Bill 2223, as amended
in the Senate on July 14, 1991.
Appendix B reprints an excellent commentary by Robert E.
Merritt, "The Permit Streamlining Act: The Dream and the
Reality."
THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT
Familiarly known as "CEQA," the 1970 California Environmental
Quality Act requires state and local agencies to review the
environmental effects of projects before they make decisions.
If a project may have adverse environmental effects, public
officials must avoid the effects, mitigate the effects, or
proceed anyway in light of overriding concerns. Although
easily described, determining a project's environmental effects can be complicated in practice.
Process. Officials must first determine whether their decision is a project which is subject to CEQA. Both the Act and
its interpretive regulations, the CEQA Guidelines, exempt
certain types of projects.
If a project is not exempt, officials conduct an initial study to discover whether the project may have significant adverse environmental effects.
If
there are no significant effects, the agency fulfills its
CEQA obligation by issuing a negative declaration. But if
there may be significant effects, officials must prepare an
environmental impact report (EIR). After circulating a draft
EIR and receiving public comments, the agency completes and
certifies the final EIR.
For each significant effect, the
agency must avoid it, mitigate it, or adopt a finding that
there are social or economic considerations that override the
environmental effect.
Deadlines. CEQA sets several deadlines for public officials
to act, but one deadline is particularly important in understanding AB 2223.
Every state and local agency must set a
deadline for completing its environmental documents. The
maximum deadline for EIRs is one year, measured from the date
that the agency accepted the project application as complete.
The maximum deadline for negative declarations is 105 days.
The statute allows public agencies to provide "reasonable"
time extensions for "compelling circumstances," and the CEQA
Guidelines permit one 90-day extension. But the statute bans
the earlier practice of rejecting applications unless they
agree to waive the time deadline {SB 523, Russell, 1987).
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THE PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT
Responding to the political controversy surrounding Dow Chemical Company's problems in getting permits to build a chemical plant in Solano County, the Legislature passed the Permit
Streamlining Act (AB 884, McCarthy, 1977). The Legislature
wanted officials "to expedite decisions" on projects.
Process. The Act applies to every "development project," a
term which includes entitlements and permits to construct,
but not permits to operate.
Nor does it include ministerial
(non-discretionary) permits. The Act does not apply to legislative decisions, such as general plan and zoning adoptions
and amendments and LAFCO boundary changes.
For example, a
discretionary conditional use permit is a "development project" subject to the Permit Streamlining Act, but a ministerial building permit is not.
The process begins when a proponent files an application for
a development project with a public agency.
The agency has
30 days to determine if the application is complete.
Public
officials must tell the applicant what criteria they use to
decide whether an application is complete.
If the agency
finds that the application is not complete, officials must
tell the applicant what's missing.
If the agency fails to
respond within 30 days, then the Act says that the application "shall be deemed complete."
Deadlines.
If CEQA requires an EIR for the project, the Permit Streamlining Act requires the agency to approve or disapprove the application within one year, measured from the date
that the agency accepted the project application as complete.
The Act allows one 90-day extension if both the agency and
the applicant consent.
If the agency has extended CEQA's
deadline to complete an EIR, the Permit Streamlining Act requires officials to act on the project within 90 days of certifying the EIR (SB 413, Davis, 1983). Further, the Act explains, these statutory deadlines are "maximum time limits"
and directs public agencies to act sooner ''if possible."
Deemed approved.
If the public agency does not act within
the statutory time limits, the Act says that ''failure to act
shall be deemed approval" of the project.
In other words,
inaction leads to approval. According to Robert Merritt, a
close observer of this statute, "automatic approval lies at
the heart of the Act." But, Merritt notes:
In the brief 13 years since enactment, numerous
appellate court decision have interpreted the Act.
Only two cases ... have upheld automatic approval.
For the most part, the judiciary has been hostile
to the Act, severely limiting its application.

Merritt's excellent review, "The Permit Streamlining Act: The
Dream and the Reality," appears in Appendix B.
WHAT THE COURTS SAY
Knowing what the Legislature has done, now it is important
to understand how the courts interpret the Permit Streamlining Act.
The "Landi" decision. Just what the "deemed approved" provision applies to and what it does not affect was one of the
earliest issues in implementing the Permit Streamlining Act.
California's land use laws generally distinguish between legislative acts which make policies and adjudicatory decisions
which apply the policies to specific situations. The adoption and amendment of general plans and zoning ordinances are
legislative acts which set land use policies. The approval
of development projects (e.g., subdivision maps, conditional
use permits) are adjudicatory decisions.
The court used this distinction in the 1983 decision Landi v.
County of Monterey. When asked if the Permit Streamlining
Act applied to the rezoning of 18 acres, the Court said that
the law only covers adjudicatory actions. Therefore, the
Act's deadlines and its central "deemed approved" concept do
not apply to legislative decisions such as zoning ordinances
and their underlying general plans.
In his article, Merritt
shows how other courts have applied the Landi decision.
The "Palmer" decision. The 1986 case Palmer v. City of ojai
upheld the automatic approval of a permit because city officials failed to meet the Permit Streamlining Act's deadlines.
But after the Palmer decision, attorneys became worried that
adjacent landowners' rights to due process could be violated.
If the Act resulted in automatic approvals without adjacent
landowners receiving notice, the landowners would be deprived
of their constitutional right to due process; public notice
of an action affecting their property. Another court reached
this conclusion in a 1989 case, Selinger v. City Council.
Alerted by attorneys to anticipate the problem, the Legislature responded to the Palmer decision in 1987 by amending the
Act to require that public notice be given before a permit
can be deemed approved. The Act now allows the applicant to
give 60 days of public notice, then the permit is deemed approved (AB 1486, Sher, 1987). Merritt, however, worries that
the Act remains constitutionally insufficient despite this
reform. Although adjacent landowners now have a way to receive public notice, they still do not have an opportunity to
be heard at a public hearing.
The "Land Waste Management" decision. When interpreting two
statutes which apply to the same case, the courts often write
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about the need to harmonize the laws; to read them together
so that they both make sense. The August 1990 case Land
Waste Management v. Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors
interpreted the relationship between the "deemed approved"
provision in the Permit Streamlining Act and CEQA's requirement to complete an EIR.
The decision held that CEQA does not automatically certify an
EIR even if officials miss the statutory one-year deadline.
Further, the court said that the automatic approval provisions of the Permit Streamlining Act do not apply to CEQA.
"Nowhere in CEQA is there any provision for automatic or
'deemed' certification of EIRs if action is not taken within
one year." The Court's decision continued:
Moreover, the Permit Streamlining Act, which was
enacted after CEQA, did not add any automatic approval provision for EIRs, and did not mention EIR
certification in the automatic approval provisions
which it did set forth.
The Legislature must be
presumed to have been aware of the CEQA time limits
at the time it enacted the Permit Streamlining Act,
indicating its tacit intent to leave the law as it
stands. (citations] In view of the Legislature's
failure to enact such a drastic provision, we now
decline to read it into CEQA ourselves.
Reviewing the Land Waste Management case, Merritt comments:
Implied, but unstated, was rejection of the concept
of a deemed approval without compliance with CEQA.
Unfortunately, Land Waste Management does not address the question of how the time periods for
action on adjudicatory permits are affected when
the agency ... fails to complete the CEQA process.
Merritt's article goes on to note that exactly this kind of
conflict between CEQA and the Permit Streamlining Act surfaced in a land use controversy in the City of Los Angeles
neighborhood of Venice.
601 OCEAN FRONT WALK
In mid-October 1988, Stephen M. Blanchard filed four applications with the city of Los Angeles to develop his property
at 601 Ocean Front Walk in the Venice area.
Blanchard wanted
to build a multi-story building with restaurants and retail
stores.
These applications "were deemed complete by the
Planning Department" in late October.
In November 1988, city
planners told Blanchard that he needed to apply for two more
city permits.
By mid-January 1989, all of Blanchard's permits "were 'deemed complete' by the City."

city planners published and mailed notices of their April
1989 public hearing before an Associate Zoning Administrator.
In October 1989, the city staff issued a proposed "mitigated
negative declaration" for the first set of Blanchard's applications.
In November 1989, a neighbor protested the proposed
negative declaration.
In early December 1989, Blanchard's
attorney asked the city to act on his client's applications,
reminding the City of the Permit Streamlining Act's deadlines.
In February 1990, the city staff issued another proposed mitigated negative declaration; this time covering all
of Blanchard's applications.
In March 1990, the neighbor
also protested this CEQA document.
In mid-May 1990, Blanchard's attorney "demanded that the City
immediately issue each of the permits." Because the City had
failed to act within the one-year deadline of the Permit
Streamlining Act, Blanchard's attorney claimed that the permits had been deemed approved.
In mid-July 1990, the Los
Angeles City Attorney advised planners that it appeared that
the permits were deemed approved.
Later in July 1990, the
Associate Zoning Administrator issued a formal ruling that
Blanchard's six permits were all deemed approved.
In early August 1990, the District Court of Appeal issued its
Land Waste Management decision. The court said that the Permit Streamlining Act's "deemed approved" provision does not
apply to EIRs prepared under CEQA.
In August 1990, the neighbor appealed the staff decision to
the City's Board of Zoning Appeals. The Venice North Beach
Coalition, a neighborhood group, sued the City, naming Blanchard as the real party in interest. The Coalition asked the
Superior Court to reverse the city staff's ruling, to require
the City to reconsider the permits, and to require the City
to prepare an EIR.
In early October 1990, the State Department of Justice, acting in the name of then-Attorney General John Van de Kamp,
told the city's Board of Zoning Appeals that the recent Land
Waste Management decision was the controlling law. The
state's attorney told city officials that they should reverse
their Zoning Administrator's decision.
In mid-October, the City's Board of Zoning Appeals overruled
its Zoning Administrator, determined that the permits had not
been deemed approved, and sent the issue back to the staff.
In January 1991, Blanchard sued the City, asking the Superior
Court to mandate city officials to issue his permits. Blanchard also filed a $20 million damage claim against the City.
In March 1991, Assemblywoman Moore introduced her Assembly
Bill 2223 at the request of Los Angeles city Councilmember
Ruth Galanter who represents the Venice area.

On May 31, 1991, the Los Angeles City Council signed a settlement agreement with Blanchard and agreed to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Issue all six permits, subject to detailed conditions.
Grant other permits, subject to detailed conditions.
Not oppose permits issued by the Coastal Commission.
Not oppose Alcoholic Beverage Control Board permits.
Withdrawal of Blanchard's suit and damage claim.
Mutual release of all claims and liabilities.
Defend the agreement against legal challenges, including
the Coalition's suit against the City.

In early June 1991, the Assembly passed AB 2223 by the vote
of 43-30. On July 17, the Senate Local Government Committee
held the bill for interim study.
In November 1991, the Coastal Commission approved its permits
for Blanchard's project.
The Coalition's suit against the City is still pending. The
superior Court may hear the case before the end of 1991.
THE POLICY QUESTION AND THE ALTERNATIVES
Regardless of the legislative record, the court decisions,
and even Venice project's contentious history, the 1991-92
Legislature must confront this central policy question:
What is the relationship between the deadlines in
the Permit Streamlining Act and the California Environmental Quality Act?
The Committee members need to step back from the specifics of
the bill and decide how CEQA's one-year deadline for finishing an EIR should fit with the Permit Streamlining Act's oneyear deadline for acting on projects. The December 17 hearing should give legislators at least three choices:
1. CEQA first.
Public officials must comply with CEQA
before they act on development projects.
In October 1990,
advising Los Angeles officials, the Attorney General's office
wrote:
Allowing a project to be approved without compliance with CEQA would result in the very "gamesmanship" the (Permit Streamlining Act] was designed to
avoid.
Applicants could attempt to delay the approval process as long as possible to gain approval
without compliance with CEQA.
Similarly, governmental entities could avoid their CEQA obligations
by failing to act on development applications,
thereby allowing the project to be "deemed approved" without full compliance with CEQA.

Other observers reject this approach, saying that the Attorney General was "absolutely wrong." They argue that an agency could easily circumvent the "deemed approved" provision of
the Permit Streamlining Act merely by dragging its feet in
the CEQA process. As long as the agency never finishes its
CEQA document, then the Permit Streamlining Act never applies. Officials could use CEQA to vitiate the Legislature's
desire for a one-year deadline on development decisions.
2. Same deadlines. Use the one-year deadlines in both
CEQA and the Permit Streamlining Act.
CEQA says that one
year is long enough to complete an EIR, but it allows time
extensions. The Permit Streamlining Act sets a one-year
deadline on development decisions, but it allows one 90-day
extension. Agencies can still disapprove projects that are
harmful or unpopular.
Neither law requires officials to approve development projects; they just have to make up their
minds within the year.
If a project is deemed approved under the Permit Streamlining
Act without having a final CEQA document, it is still possible to challenge the project. CEQA already gives potential
litigants 180 days to file lawsuits challenging projects for
failure to have an EIR or negative declaration.
Those who oppose this approach complain that it involves too
much litigation, usually at the expense of neighborhood
groups who are poorly financed. Why should citizens' groups
have to sue public agencies when officials fail to follow the
law? Shouldn't the Legislature instead place the legal burden on public officials to follow the law?
3. Tolling. Merritt's article suggests "tolling" as a
third alternative. Noting that Permit Streamlining Act's
deadlines do not apply to legislative decisions (the Landi
and Land Waste Management cases), Merritt explores the possibility that the Act's one-year deadline should be suspended
while officials finish their legislative decisions.
In other words, if the required legislative action
is not taken by the time the ... one-year time period has run on the permit applications, the time
is extended until the legislative action occurs.
Thus, at the time of the legislative action, the
agency will also be required to act on the permits.
Similarly, Merritt suggests that the conflict between the
CEQA and Permit Streamlining Act deadlines could be resolved
by using "the tolling approach [to] breathe some life back
into the Act." He argues that tolling would be more consistent with the Act's original purpose and less drastic than
having to wait for a final CEQA document.
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APPENDIX A
- 11 -

021

AMENDED IN SENATE JULY 14, 1991
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY

~IAY

24, 1991

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1991-92 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 2223

Introduced by Assembly Member Moore
March 12, 1991

An act to amend Section 65956 of the Government Code,
relating to local planning.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 2223, as amended, Moore.
Development project
approval: California Environmental Quality Act.
Existing law requires state and local agencies to hold
hearings, give specified public notices, and approve or
disapprove development projects, as defined, within specified
times. Existing law specifically requires a public agency which
is a lead agency, as defined, to approve or disapprove a
development project within one year from the date an
application requesting approval is received and accepted as
complete by the lead agency and requires a responsible
agency, as defined, to approve or disapprove development
projects within 180 days of the date the lead agency takes
action or within 180 days of the date on which the application
is received and accepted as complete. In the event that a lead
agency or responsible agency fails to meet these time limits
and the public notice required by law has occurred, the
failure is deemed to be approval of the permit application for
the development project under existing law.
This bill would also require compliance by the permitting
agency with the California Environmental Quality Act prior
to the permit application for the development project being
deemed approved due to the failure of the lead agency or
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responsible agency to meet those time limits.
The bl11 would also state the intent of the Legislature in
amending these provisions of existing law.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the St:lte of California do enact as follons:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

SECTION 1. Section 65956 of the Government Code
is amended to read:
65956. (a) If any provision of law requires the lead
agency or responsible agency to provide public notice of
the development project or to hold a public hearing, or
both, on the development project and the agency has not
provided the public notice or held the hearing, or both,
at least 60 days prior to the expiration of the time limits
established by Sections 65950 and 65952, the applicant or
his or her representative may file an action pursuant to
Section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure to compel the
agency to provide the public notice or hold the hearing,
or both, and the court shall give the proceedings
preference over all other civil actions or proceedings,
except older matters of the same character.
(b) In the event that a lead agency or a responsible
;:tgency fails to act to approve or to disapprove a
development project within the time limits required by
this article, the failure to act shall be deemed approval of
the permit application for the development project.
However, the permit shall be deemed approved only if
the public notice required by law has occurred and the
permitting agency has complied with Division 13
(commencing with Section 21000) of the Public
Resources Code. If the applicant has provided seven days
advance notice to the permitting agency of the intent to
provide public notice, then no earlier than 60 days from
the expiration of the time limits established by Sections
65950 and 65952, an applicant may provide the required
public notice using the distribution information provided
pursuant to Section 65941.5. If the applicant chooses to
provide public notice, that notice shall include a
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35

36

AB 2223

description of the proposed development substantially
similar to the descriptions which are commonly used in
public notices by the permitting agency, the location of
the proposed development, the permit application
number, the name and address of the permitting agency,
and a statement that the project shall be deemed
approved if the permitting agency has not acted within
60 days. If the applicant has provided the public notice
required by this section, the time limit for action by the
permitting agency shaH be extended to 60 days after the
public notice is provided. If the applicant provides notice
pursuant to this section, the permitting agency shall
refund to the applicant any fees which were collected for
providing notice and which were not used for that
purpose.
(c) Failure of an applicant to submit complete or
adequate information pursuant to Sections 65943 to 65946,
inclusive, may constitute grounds for disapproving a
development project.
(d) Nothing in this section shall diminish the
permitting agency's legal responsibility to provide,
where applicable, public notice and hearing before
acting on a permit application.
SEC. 2. In amending subdivision (b) of Section 65956
of the Government Code
this act, it is the intent of the
Legislature that the time limits set by C11apter 4.5
(commencing with Section 65920) of Division 1 of Title
7 of the Government Code run concurrently with the
time limits of the California Environmental Quality Act,
Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the
Public Resources Code. It is the further intent of the
Legislature that no development project shall be deemed
approved pursuant to Section 65956 of the Government
Code until the lead agency and any responsible agency
has filed the notice required by Section 21108 or Section
21152 of the Public Resources Code.
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THE PERMIT

STREAMLINING ACT
The Dream and the Reality
It was an idea wllosc time had come -~a way to cut through the
labyrinth nl fl'll tape and dispel Cdilornia's antibusiness reputation. Embraced hy the Jerry Bmwn admini~tratiun and written hy Assembly Speaker Leo McCarthy, the hill creating the Permit Streamlining Act tGovl C
~~651>20-h)%:1. l l tAB XX-tl received only one "no" vote as it sailed
through the Legislature. It garnerL~d support from such diverse groups as
tile California Clwmhcr 1ll Comllwrce. the California Manufacturers AsS\1ciation, tht: Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth. Almost everyone agreed
that the land usc permitting process in California had gone completely \lUI
1'1 contrPI. An editorial comment in the San Fmncisco Climnicle retlectcd
the optimi~m behind the lcgislati(ln. "This spur to regulatory action is welcome and rca~on~thk, and u~nain tu assure potential business de\·clopers
tilat Calil\lrnia \\'l'il'Ollll'S them." Sun Froncisco ( 'ltronicfe. rvhty 2ll, I1J77.
The single event that served as a catalyst to enactment ol the Permit
Streamlining :\ct \V,lS tile withdrawal hy Dmv Chemical Company (JI
applications to build a '!>50() million petrochemical plant at Cllllinsvillc. a
'mall town cast ol San Francisco. Dow reportedly spent two and a hall

Roh~rt E. Merritt received his J.D. from the University of California (Boalt Halll in I 966. He is a
p;U1ner in !he San Francisco office of McCutchen.
Doyle. flrown & Enersen. A memb,,r of the American (\>!lege of Real Estate Lawyers, he ha.- lectured
and wntten extensively on real property and land use
suhjecl,. His hooks include California Suhdivision
~1ap Act Prac·tice (Cal CEfl 1987) (co-author) and
(Juide to ( 'alifornia Suhdivision Sales Law (Cal CEB
197 4 ), and he is a frequent contributor to CEB 's Real
Property Law Reporter. Mr. Merritt is an Executive
Editor of the Land Use Forum. He also serves as a
memher of the Planning Committee for the annual
CEB R~al Prop<'rty Institute and a consultant to the
Rcall'rtlpcrty Suhcommittec ofCEB's Joint Advisory CcHllmHtce.

Robert E. Merritt

yc:u·s and nver S-+.5 million in attempts to
oht:un <15 required pcnnits. After ohtainlllL! only fnur desplle its effort\. Dow
called 11 qu11;,.

fact. the real prohlem for Dow wa;,
111 geujng pennas hut its in:Jhli!lv to meet air
standards dictated largely hy tllc JlJ7() federal Clean
.-\n Act. Pcnnu stre:unlining Wt1Uid have
dune rwthing to remove this madhlock.
!\;e\ en he less. when Duw made tl1e deci~i\ln to hlllld elsewhere, the hlmne was
placed on a faceless hurcaucracy and to
a lcssc·r extent on the Brown administration. Ironically. less lhanayearearliertl1e
Rav An.:a p,lllution Control District had
alsu hlockcd Arco Chemical Company, a
dinsmn of Atlmltic Richfield, !rom
building a\ I billion petrochermcaJ facilIty on property adjoining lhe Dow site. In
cnmpan"on to tl1e furor raised over tl1c
Dow facility. Arco 's denial went virtually
11!111 0 l icc d.
!11

nut ddavs

110\\' IT WORKS-IN THEORY

The Pennit Stre;unlining Act

(not

the

Act\ Dllicial designation-lhe nmnc has

been tacked on hy various court<> and
commcntatnrSl was intended to establish
ri!!Pmus time lines for state and local
:1genucs ttl act on development pennil<>.
On the tiling of <m application for a dc\'clopment prOJCCt, the agency h<L<; 30
days to nollfy the applicall! of deliciencres Ill the app!Jcallon or lt will he
deemed complete. Govt C $65943(hi.
The agency t11en has a limned pen()(l
wHhin whiL'h to take action on t11e application tmce rt is complete; one year if llle
pwJeCt requires <m cnvtronmental impact
repon under the Califomia Environmental Quality Act tCEQA) (Pub Res C
~ ~I 000-21177), ;md six monlhs if a
negative declaration is required or the
proJect is exempt from CEQA. Govt C
~65950. Failure of lhe agency to act wilhin the applicable time period results in lhe
applicatHlll being "deemed approved."
which me<ms approved as a matter of law
wtthout actual action being taken. Govt C
~(1595()( b).
The focus of this article is on applications processed tllrough local agencies,
altlwugh tl1e b~l<>ic scheme of the Act appltes to state agencies as well.
The Office of Pennit Assisumce
\OP/\), a p:u'l of the Governor's Office nf
PLumml! anJ Research, is chm·ged wilh
the duty of assisting agencies in implementmg t11e Act and resolving conflicts

- 16 -

*)C
( ) f' .. ~)

when a development proJeCt affcl'ls more
th:m one agency. The office is also eager
tn assist applicants who feel that an
agency is nut adhering to the Act. As ;m
ann of the Govcmor's otlice, OPA can
bring considerable pressure to hear ,m
state agencies. Anion against recalcitrant
local agcnncs usually takes l11e lnnn nt
written or vcrhal reminders ot the
agency's responsibilities under the Act.
Unfortunately, m:my frustrated appliculls do not seck assistance from OPA,
prohahly because ti1ey do not realize assist:mce is available. Anol11er problem is
that applicmHs who du seek help wmt too
long. TI1e hencf"it of OPA's involvement
cnmes from cajoling agencies into compliance; OPA cannot punish l11c agency
after the fact. ( Applic;mts with problems
involving compli<mce with tile Act
should contact David C. Nuncnk;unp or
Christine Kinne of OPA.l
The scope of ti1c Act is detenmncd by
the key tenns, "development proJect,"
"development," ;md "proJect." The Act is
triggered by the filing of an application
for a development project. A development proJect is defined as ;my prnJCCt undertaken for the purpose of development.
Project means ;my activity involvmg the
issuance to a person of a lease, penntt, license, certificate ur other entitlement for
use by one or nHJre public agencies. Gnvt
C ~(J5931. Development is broadly delined to cnwmp;L<;S virtually any activlly
a!lccUn_;! land Pr water. It includes the
placement or erection of any solid material or structure; grading, removing, dredging, minmg, or extraction of any matcnal:
~.:h<mgc in the Jcn~ity ur intensity of usc
of land; and construction, rcconstrucunn,
demolition. or alteration of l11c sit.c of any
structure. Gnvt C ~(15927. The detinHHm
was clearly taken from the Califomia
Co:L"tal Act of 1976 (Pub Res C §30m030lJOO), because the two definitions of
development arc virtually identical.
Compare Govt C §65927 witi1 Pub Res C
§30 106, and sec GeorJ?ta-Pactjic Corp. v
Caliji>rnia Coastal Comm'n (19X2l 132
CA3d 67X, 6lJ5, 1X3 CR 395, 405. Although the Act specifics that its definitions only shall govem construction of
the Act, GL<;es interpreting "dcvclopmclll" under the Coastal Act may he persuasive. See, e.g., Sierra Club r .Harsh
(SDCalllJXX)692FSupp 121f)(U.S.aclJUisiuon of land for wildlife refuge not
development l; Montcrev Sand Co. v California Coastal Comm 'n ( 19i-:7) 191

CA3d l6lJ, 236 CR 315 (s;md extraction
from sea floor is development); /)e/ucchi
\' Cnuntv o(Santa Cruz ( 19X6) 179 C A3d
X14, 225 CR ..J-3 <greenhouses cunstitutc
dcvclopmcnll;
Calijimua
Coastal
Comm 'n v (Juanta lnv. Corp. ( l W\t)) 113
C A 3d 579, 170 CR 263 (stock cooperative conversion deemed development).
There arc a number of express exclusions from the Act, including pennits to
operate tGovt C *65lJ2X), final subdivision maps tGovt C §65927), ministerial
projccL<> tGovt C *n5lJ2X), ch;mge of org:mil.ation or a renrg:mization under the
District Rcorg:mization Act or 1965
(Govt C ~*56000-5649X) (Govt C
*(15927), land divisions in connection
with U1C purch:L~e of land by public agenL"tes lor public recreational uses (Govt C
*05927), removal or harvesting of major
vegetation oti1er th:m for agricultural purp\lscs <Govt C ~(15927), kelp harvesting
tGovt C §65927), timber operations under the z· Bcrg-Nejcdly Forest Practice
Act of Jl)73 (Govt C §(15927), certain
applications to appropriate water under
l11c Water Code <Govt C *65955), and activities of the State Energy Resources Development ;md Conscrvatjon Commission (Govt C §65922). There are also
special provisions on application of the
Act to issuance of pcnniL-; for hazardous
W<L'Itc facility projects. Govt C *65963.1.
An import:mt exclusion is for '"penn its
to operate." Vague at best, ti1is phrase h:L'i
been construed by only one coun, which
found llwt it encompassed a pcnnit rcqmred hy the State Lands Commission t\J
conduct geophysical research in CIXL'ital
waters. Accordingly, tile pcnnit w;L-; not
subject to the Act. Meridwn Ocean Srs.
v State Lands Comm 'n ( Jl)l)()) 222 CA3d
153, 271 CR ++5. When tile pennit relates to both the siting and operation of a
facility, it is unclear whether the Act applies. TI1is is frequently the c:L-;e wil11
conditional usc pcnnits for location of
businesses. For example, a truck tcnninal
may he given the right to operate in a particular location as long as truck movement is confined to particular hours. A
court would probably look carefully at
the penniuing process :md the underlying
zoning and general plan designation:-. I\)
dctcnninc whether l11eir main purpose is
to regulate development or usc.
Ministerial actions arc not covered by
l11e Act. Therefore, if the action is not taken, the applicant must bring an ordinary

mand:unus action under CCP *I 085 t11
L"ornpcl the agency to issue the pcnnit.
Hollman \' Warren (194X) 32 C2d 351.
355, 1% P2d 562. 565; California Ass ·n
r!( Health Facilities \' Kizer ( 1986) 17,'\
CA3d 1109, 1114, 224 CR 247, 249.
Building pennits are often ministerial.
Some jurisdictions, however, have made
building pennits discretionary, in which
case the Act should apply. Fontana Unified ,)'chon/ Dist. v Citv of Rialto ( 1985)
173 CA3d 725, 219 CR 254. Attomcys
can make ti1is detennination hy reviewing the local building ordinance. When
the building pennit is discretionary, usually no action under CEQA is required
because issu:mec of the pennlt may well
he categorically exempt. 14 Cal Cudc
Regs §* 1530 I, 15303. TI1crcfore, the sixmollths deemed approval provision of the
Act will apply. (See The Deemed Approval Stage, below.)
Sometimes questions arc raised about
whcl11cr ti1c Act applies to public agencies. TI1erc appears to he nothing precluding application when one agency is seeking a penn it from another. The definition
of "project" under the Act refers to "the
issu;mce to a person of a lease, penn it, license, certificate, or other entitlement"
(emphasis added) and the tcnn "person··
often includes public agencies. Govt C
~65931; sec. e.g., Pub Res C §21 066 with
respect to CEQA. Consistent with this
view, "development" includes "ccmstnJCtion, recoustruction, demolition, or alteration of the size of any structure, including any facility uf any private, public, or
mtmlcipul utility.'' (Emphasis added.!
Govt C §65927. To see how the Act
works, it helps to separate the Act into
two stages---the "application stage" and
the "deemed approval stage.'' These two
st:tges arc explained below and summarized in tJ1c chart on p 38.

The Application Stage
The application stage is the starting
line for pennit applications under the
Act. It hegins when the applicant files an
application for a development project
with the lead agency. The "lead agency"
is l11e one having principal responsibility
for approving the development project.
Govt C §65929. It must be distinguished
from '"responsible agencies," which have
discretionary approval power over a proJect, but which are not lead agencies. 14
Cal Code Regs §15381.
31

- 17 -

o;-;:6
The application swge also serves an
important function under the SubdivisiOn
Map Act tGnvt C ~~664J0-6MYY.3h
C'umplction ()f the application locks l!l

the ordin;mces, policies. and

~tandmds

that apply to the local
deustn!l
to approve or dtsappmvc the tenl<ilivc
map. Govt C ~hM7..J..2. Likewise. m the
case of a vesting tentative map, these nrdinanccs, policies. and standards generally establish the nmurc of tl1c vested
to develop the property. Govl C
~6649R.l.

To inform the applicant of the
agency's application requirements, tl1e
Act requires each state and local agency
to develop ;md keep current a list of information required in submitting ;m application. Govt C ~§65Y40. 65942. The information must include the criteria the
agency will apply in deterrmning the
completeness uf the application. Govt C
§65941.
On suhmtssion of an applicatmn. tllc
lead agency h~L~ 30 calendar days to deterrnine if the application is complete. To
trigger the 30-day requirement, the applicant must state in the application that It is
an application for a development pennn.
Govt C §65()43. In addition, the applicant
must submit a ~igncd statement indicating whether the proJeCt is located on ;my
listed hazardous w<L'>te sites. Lists of
these sites arc distributed to each city and
county by the Secret:1ry of Environmental Affairs. Govt C ~65Y62.5. If the
agency fails to make a written determination within 30 days, the application is
Llccmed complete. Agcncic;.. arc held
strictly to the 30-Jay period. See Orst \'
Citv Counnl ( IYY()) 21 Y CA3d 1576, 2M\
CR 912 (court refused to allow a city to
reject an application 41 days after
).
A complete application. whether determined by the agency to he complete or
deemed complete by p<L'>sage of time,
starts the clock running for action on the
application-the deemed approval stage.
If the application is found incomplete,
the agency's response to the applicant
must include a list and description of the
specific information needed to make the
application complete. TI1e applicant may
then resubmit the application along with
the required materials listed by the
agency. The rcsuhmiWtl hegins ;mother
30-day period for the agency to determine completeness. ;md, if the agency
docs not re~pund with a written determi32

nation, the application will be dcemco
complete. If the agency again detennincs
that the application is not complete, the
must he provided a means ttl
Local
may provide ft)f
appeals to the planning commission. the
body, or both. Agenctes ha\'ing no goveming b\)lly may dcs1gnate the
tlircnor to hear appeals. The appeal mu~t
he decided withm 60 calcnilitr days after
the application i~ recci ved: if il is not. the
application shall he deemed complete.
TI1e applicam ;md !11e agency can mutually agree to extend ;my of the time lirml\
under the application submission stage.
Govt C §65943.
The resubminal provision of the Act
applies only when the agency reJects the
applicalion in a timely manner. In Ors1 v
Citv Council, supra, after the 30-day penod had run ;md tlle application had been
deemed complete by operation of law. the
applic;uH resubmitted the application at
the city's request The court found that by
cnopcrating with the city in making the
rcsuhmiWll, the applicant did not waive
the benefit<; already obtained under the
Act

The Deemed Approval Stage
Once the application is complete and
;t-;suming the project is not exempt from
CEQA, the lead agency must conduct ;m
initial study under CEQA to determine
whether an EIR is required or whether a
negative decl;tration will suffice. 14 Cal
Code Regs § 15063. The lead agency is
directed to make this deterrnination with·
in 30 days, although tl1is time can he extended
15
will! consent of the
applic;mt and U1e agency. Pub Res C
I OX0.2. ll' the lead agency reqmrcs
preparation of an
then it must approve or disapprove the project withm
one year from IJJe date the application
W<L~ complete or deemed complete. Govt
C §65950. If l11e project is exempt from
CEQA or the agency determines that a
negative declaration can be adopted, the
agency's period to act is limited to six
months. Govt C §65950. The applicable
time c~m he extended for up to 90 days by
agreement of the applicant <md the
agency. Govt C §65957.
There <trc some exceptions to these
time limits. For insumce, when <m extension of time is given to complete and certify the EIR, the agency must act wtthm
90 days after certification of the ErR.

Govt C §65lJ50. I. If an EIR is combined
with an environmental impact statement
under the Nariona.l Environmental Policy
Act (42 USC
1-43-Pl, the agency
can waive the time limits under the Act,
hut must act wilhin60
after the comhined statemem is
Govt C
§65951.
Rcsponsihle agencies must act w1thin
l i\0 days after the lead agency approval
nf the project or l ISO days after acceptailce of a completed application by the
responsible agency, whichever is later.
Govt C §65Y52. If the lead agency disapproves the application, the application
before the responsible agency is deemed
to be withdrawn. Govt C §65952(h).
The Subdivision Map Act imposes
certain IHne limits on subdivision approvals. Govt C §§66452.1, 66452.2,
66463. Failure of the agency to meet
these limil'; also resulls in deemed approvaL Gmt C §66452.4. The Act provides that these time limil<> shall continue
to apply and are not extended by the time
limits specltled in the Act. Govt C
§65952.1. Although this provision may
shorten the time for acting on subdivision
maps, it has little practical impact because the approval of the maps must still
comply witlJ due process ;md the deemed
approval does not avoid the need w make
lindings as required under the Subdivision Map Act. Horn v County
Ventura
(I Y79) 24 C'3d 605, 156 CR 718; Wi:)()(iLand Hills Residents Ass'n v Citv Council
(1975) 44 CA3d X25, 118 CR X56.
The penalty for the lead or responsible
agency's f~lllure to act within the time allowed is "deemed approval" of the project Govt C §65956(h). This automatic
approval lies at the heart of the Act. However, when t11e law requires public notice
;md opportunity for a hearing, the process
perfecting deemed approval has become
quite involved. The process and its deficiencies arc discussed in The Third Blow:
Denial of Due Process, below.
This simplistic explanation of the Act
conceals a tortured past. In the brief 13
years since enactment, numerous appellate court decisions have interpreted the
Act. Only two cases (Palmer v Citv of
Ojai ( 1986) 178 CA3d 280, 223 CR 542,
;md Orsi v Citv Council, supra, discussed
helow) havC' upheld automatic approval.
For the most part, the judiciary has been
hostile to the Act, severely limiting its
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application. \Vc tum now to some of these
judicial stnkes ;md <L<>sess tlle d;unage.
THE FIRST BLOW: Lcgi~lativt• Acts .\rc
\Jot Suhjcd 11, the Ad

No one would have guessed from the
puhlicity attending the Act's passa_!!c that
it was intended to apply to something less
than the en me hundlc ol cntttlcmcnts required lnr a dcvclopmclll proJeCt. In tact.
gtven the brcadtlJof the dctlnition nl"developmcnt" and the fact that it includes a
"change in the density or intensity of usc
or land." one would have expected lew
limitauons on tile scope of the Act. Nevertheless, the lirs t appc II ate case to construe the Act held tJJat it did not apply to
legtslative acttons-- in this case <m <tpplication to rezone I X acres in l'v1untcrcy
County to mmply with the general plan.
The court hdd that unly adJudicawrv actmns arc "proJccL<>" under the Act. Lundi
v Cuunlv o(Monterev t Jl)i\3) 139 CA3d
934, I Xll CR 55.
It is unclear what in!lucnccd the cuurl
in Lundi. The court focused on the term
"project," ;,t;ltmg that zoning and similm
legislative acL'> arc not projects under the
Act. But that tcnn is not limited to pcrmns-11 includes any "tJthcr entitlement
lor usc." Govt C ~65931. The view that
the Act applies onlv to adjudicatory acts
was held by mcmhcrs of tl1c staff within
the Office pf Planmng and Research, who
were hcanly tmnlved in drafting tJ1c lcgi"lation crc:tllng the Act. An article hy
tHlc of the stall exprcssmg th1s interpretation may tlave nad an effect. Sec Wright.
An 884: Srreumlining 1/ze Permil Pro( es.1, Office ot Planning ami Research
(urea llJ77- 7i0. Probably the court '>ltnpiy could not accept that the Legislature
intended maJor i<Uld usc planning within
a wnununity to occur hy default. The legislative-adjudicatory distinction was a
convenient line hctween policy dccisinns
alfccung tile community at large (such as
general plan ;uncndments) and tiwsc entitlements ti1at were project oriented
(;,uch as suhdivision maps). Of course,
because must major adjudicatory land usc
decisions must he consistent wit11 the
community's general plan. by excluding
legislative changes from the ;unhit of t11e
Act. the court put the Act on a collision
course w1ti1 tl1c consistency doctrme if
the undcrl\mg legislative foundation
( p;micularly :uncndment of the general
pl;m) has nut hccn laid. The collision llCcurred seven years later in Lmui n·(Jste

Munar.;nncnl l' liuurd , 'I
t 199()) 222 CAJd 9'i0. 27! CR 90lJ, (lis-

cussed below. For a di.\cu:-,s1on of general
plan consistency requ1remcnL'-', "ec Curry.
Merritt & Rivera. Gmerul Plans: Coming of Age in Calijinnlil. 14 CEB Real
Prnp L Rep 141 t Ma:v 199 ll. In any
event, the rule ti1at t11c Act doc;, not apply
to legislative actions is now dearly estahlisltcd. Moreover. tJ1c Legislature apparently acquiesced wllh the decision in
Lundi. The Act w:L' amended in jLJi\7 to
provide that tllC failure ur the agency to
act resulted in approval uf t11e "pcnnit
application," where turmerly the statute
referred to appmval nf the "project.··
Stats 19X7, ch 9X5 ~5. This was v1cwcd
by a later cuurt a;, \ ahdating the Lunrli
decision. Sec Land \\lnle ,Hwwgement v
llourd uJ SuperTt.\or.l t llJl)()) 222 CA3d
'J50. %() n4. 271 CR l)()lJ. 'I 15 n.f; !vf eridi1111 ( Jcewt Svs. v Stutt' Lmds Comm 'n
( IYlJ()) :222 CA3d 153, .271 CR 445.
The lcgislativc-atljudicalOry distinction is simple in cnncept. An action is legislative if it prcscrihcs a new policy nr
plan; it is adminisu·auv.: ur adjudicatory
if it merely pursues a plan already
adopted hy ti1c legislative body. McKnitt
\' Citv of,'-;ucrumenl,, t ll!21) 55 CA 117,
203 P 132; 5 McQuillin on Municipal
Corporations~ 16:55 (3d ed Jl)X9). Adoption of general plan amendments, specific
plans, development agreements, :md znnmg mc:L~urcs arc usually legislative. In
contrast, approval ol tentative ;,uhdivision maps, \ari:Uiccs, and cunditiona1 usc
pcnnits arc seen :L'> adjudicatory. Ame/
l>cv. Co. v Citv of Cos111 ivfesa ( 19XO) 2X
C3d 511, loll CR IJ04; .)'impson v Hite
( 1950) 36 C2d 125, 222 P2d 225. Sometimes tlJC distinction becomes hlurrcd.
however. In Vv'heelri;;ht \' Counrv oflv!urin (!ll70) 2 C3d 44X, X5 CR X09, for example, t11c court held that ;m ordmance
govcming construction of an access road
accurding to a prenously established
planned community was legislative in nature. The court rejected tile argument ti1at
the purpose of tlle ordin:UJce was only to
give effect to t11e previously declared legislative intent. More recently, in South-

plans and as such was administrative in
nall!re. See also IV IV !Jean & Assoc. v
Citv of S. .\'an Francisco ( Jl)87) 190
C A3d 136X. 236 CR II (amendment to
lc!!l~lau vel y enacted habitlt conservation
plan was admimstrauve in nature).
Just he cause somethmg is ca.lletl a
.. penni(' d,)cs nut mean it is adjudicawry.
In Mendiun Ucecm Svs. v State Lands
Comm ·n. supra, an application for a permit to cnnduct geophysical surveys using
undcnvater air guns was held to he legislative rather th~m adjudicatory. The court
round that the "primary tllrusC of deliberations by the State Lands Usc Commission concerning the permit involved a
policy decision about continuing to issue
:-,uch pcmuL" without first requiring an
EIR. These cases illustrate that in the innc:L->ingly complex world of land usc
pcnnitting. ~orne approvals will require
close analysis before 1t can be detcnnined
whether the Act applies.
Other cxmnplcs of close calls he tween
adJudicawry <md legislative decisions are
not hard to Imagine. For example, consider :uncndmcnt of a development agreement entered into hetween a developer
<md a city pursuant to Govt C §6586465 869.5. The statute provides that enactmcnt ol an ordinance approving a development agreement is a legislative act,
subject to referendum, Govt C *65X67.5.
Also, the "tatute provides that :uncndmenL'i must be adopted under the s:une
procedure. Govt C §65868. Yet manv
thoughtfully draJtcd development agrccmcnL-; provide that minor amendmenL<;
that do IhJl alter the required provisions
of tlle agreement can be approved administratively at the city staff level. Assuming the validity of this abbreviated (and
<L'> yet untcswd) mncndment procedure,
would a minor amendment be viewed as
legislative or adjudicatory? If adjudicatory, at what point does tlle substance of the
amendment convert tlle process from adjudtcatory to legislative? Would the result
change if the city processed the same minor amendment witll ilie formalities accorded in adoption of t11e agreement?

wesl Diva.I·Ijled, Inc. v Citv ol Brisbane
( llJ9 ll 229 CA3d 154X, 2i\O CR X6ll, the

THE SECOND BLOW: Approvals Must
Await Legislative Action

court held as administrative a rezoning
that rccontigured the boundaries of open
space and planned development districL~
to confonn to revised development plans.
ll1c court found that the action was one
of a series to implement the development

When an applicant seeks land use approvals that involve a combination ot legislative :md adjudicatory actions, what
happens if tlle legislative actions have not
occurred by ilie time the deadline for permit approval has arrived? This issue was
33
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confronted in Lund W!JS/t' Afanagnnem \'
lioard ofSupervtsors, supm. in which the
applicant sought, hut !lad not recciVt:d,
amendment of the general
a solid
waste management plan. and
to
penn it a san nary Iandi! II
Because
one memhcr of the Buard of Supervisors
abstained, the Board was deadlocked nn
enacunell! of these measures. TI1e coun
held that the county was powerless ttl
take accompanying adjudicatory actions----.:;mcellation of a Williamsnn Act
contract and issuance of a land usc permit-hccause they were mconsistem
with the existing county general plan ;mel
other legislatively enacted measures. Enactmem of the pending legislative measures was a prerequisite. This holding is
a logical extension of Landi ;md c:t-;es
holding that issu;mce of penn its IIKOll~ls
tent with the general phm or zoning arc
ultra vires. See Lesher Communications.
Inc. v Citv of Walnut Creek (I Y9()) 52 C3J
53 J, 277 CR I; Citv & Countv
San
Francisco v Board of Permit Appeals
(l Y8Y) 207 CA3J IOYY. 255 CR 307.
A similar situation arises 1f the deadlines under the Act run hcforc CEQA
processing for the project is complete.
The time limits under the Act arc tied to
the detcnnination of whether the project
requires ;m EIR or a negative declaration.
The lead agency h;t<; 30 days to make the
detennination. although this period c:m
be extended. Puh Res C 921080.2.
ll1c law pmv1dcs no penalty fix fallure of the agency to make a detennination
as to whether to prepare an EIR or negative declaration within the 30-day
(as it may he extended). Likewise, once
this detennination is made, there is no
penalty for the agency failing to adopt a
or
negative declaration within 105
certify an EIR within one year. See 14 Cal
CodeRegs*§l5107, 15108. The absence
of a penalty has been construed as meaning that the time constraint is direcwry,
rather than mandatory. Sec Meridian
Ocean Sys. v State Lands Comm 'n, supra.
lf directory, the applic~mt must wait for
the agency to act or bring a m;mdamus action under CCP § 1085 to force the agency
to decide ;md then prepare the negative
declaration or <U1 EIR.
In Land Wilste Management v Board
of .S'upervisors, supra, the court rejected
the idea. that the EIR for the project was
automatically certified hy the expiration
of the one-year time period. Implie<L but
unstated, was reJection of the concept of
34

a deemed approval without
Wllh CEQA.
Unfortunately, Land H!ute
menr docs not address the question nl
how the tJmc periods for action on
catnry pcnnits ;u·e affected when the
:t);!ency delays adopting necessary
lative enacuncnts or fails to
tlJe
CEQA process. It should have no effect
nn the application stage. There is nothing
in the Act or Lwui WcJSte Managemem to
suggest that app!icmlts must wait tor all
legtslative approvals hcfore
applications for tentative subdivision
maps, conditional use pennlls, or other
adJudicatory approvals. In fac" the Act
states that an agency must respond to the
application within 30 days after it is received. The usc of the word "received··

''The i!llricate
interplay ol udjudicatorv
and !l!gislutive actions in
land use entit!enzl:'nts was
110t envisioned hv the
LegL'l'lature, and I a I
to!!ing approach would
breathe some /if{> hack
into the Act. "

rather th;m "filed" or words of similar import suggests the agency may not he able
to refuse a proffered application. Govt C
~65943. In m;my
this is not
a concern because local
allow or
even encourage a combined filing of all
land use applications to C(XJruinate processmg. However, it may he a
m
some jurisdictions
the agency destres w condition submission of an application on completion of necessary legislative acts. One case-not involving the
Act but decided after its enactment-held
that a city by ordinance could lawful! y refuse to accept the filing of ;my application
for subdivision of property until zoning
for the property has been completed.
Bennv v City of Alameda ( 1980) I 05
CA3d 1006, 164 CR 776.
The problems arise in the deemed approval stage. A major concern is whether
the time for the agency to act hegins to
run before the
enactments
have occurred. One view is that the time
period docs not commence while legisla-

uvc acuon is pending. hut this seems unduly harsh. There is no reason for the
tn he penalized by having to
wall ;m addiuonal six months or one year
from the time the legislative action ocAnothcr view i~ to treat the pennits
to the
enactments.
counter to the
in Land ~vasre
v
Uoard of Supervisors, supra, that agencies arc powerless to issue land use permits that arc inconsistent with
legislation. Also, this solution would
deny due process to
l<mdowncrs-a problem which is discussed
later.
A better approach IS to toll the time period under the Act until the agency adopt<>
t11c necessary legislative approvals. In
nther wnrds, if the required legislative action is not taken by the time the sixmonth or one-year time period has run on
the permit applications, the time is extended until the legislative action occurs.
Tims, at the time of the legislative action.
the agency will also he required to act on
the pennits. This approach allows the
agency to attach conditions to the pennirs
or even deny them at that time. If it fails
tn act, the permits are deemed approved,
hut only to the extent they arc consistent
with the legislative enactments. While
this may be fairest to applicants, by no
means does it assure action on the penn it.
The root of the problem is that the agency
is not required to act on legislative matters. Without a mandate requiring the
agency to act, the applic;mt c;mnot appeal
to tllc courts through mandamus to require the agency to act. Eventually the
applicant may be able to perfect ;m action
for inverse condemnation, hut this rarely
is a practical strategy. It requires tbe
applicant to jump through numerous procedural
;md even then it may not be
to show that existing zoning <md
general plan designations deny the applicam economically viable use of its l;md.
Sec Agins v City of Tiburon 0 980) 447
US 255. The sad fact is that if the agency
wants to drag its feet, there is little the
applie<mt can do. The problem is most
acute at the local agency level when
islative actions are routinely required in
conjunction with the permitting process.
At the state level, there is frequently no
need for legislative action so that the
agency can be brought into court if it
chooses to ignore the Act

A related questJnn anses if the deemed
approval occur~ heforc c:EQA processing
is cnmplctc. A"sume the agency has detcnnmed an EIR is rl~quired. hut the unc
year for action on the permit applic:uton
arrives before the EIR i' ready fur ccntti
catmn. Let\ look at the possibilities. Folhlwing the logiC ot Land \}{l.\le Afww~:;e
ment. a court might find that the agcnn
is without authority to approve the pcrmtl
application until the CEQA process is
completed. This would give the agency
time to build illlo any approvaltmti}!ation
measures required by t11e EIR or negative
declaration. Or. the agency could deny
the pcnmt if warranted by adverse impacts. As su~ge~ted wJth respect to pending legislative measures. time under tlte
Act could he tolled until the CEQA prncess \V:L\ wmplctc. Another possibihty
would he lor the court Ill find a deemed
approval (:Lssuming due process issues
were adequately addressed) reasoning
that lailurc of the Legislature to condition
approval under the Act on compliance
witll CEQA cv1dcnccs ;m intent to sutx,rdinate CEQA tn l11c Act. If this were the
outcome, the courts should pennit members of the public tn challenge the approval tor failure to comply with CEQA
if an action allcgmg this deficiency was
hrought \Vllhmtlle I XO-day st:ltutc llf limiwllons applicable when no ElR or negative declaration has hccn prepared. Puh
Res C ~21167(a). Since the approval resulted i11 the ah~cllCC <1! ,1 dcci>.inn. the
statute of lirmtations wnuld run from tJ1e
date of cnmmenccment of construcuon.
or if not obvious, tlle date l11e public knew
or -,hould have known of t11c devclnpment project. Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. \' 32nd [)ist. Agriculwral
Ass 'n < 19,'\6 1 42 C3d 92Y, 231 CR 7-tX.
The facts presented in our hypothetical arose recently in the context of ;m
applicathm for construction of a mmlmall in the Venice area of Los Angelc-..
The city zoning administrator mitially
took l11e posllion that tJ1c permit was
deemed approved even though there had
hcen no complmnce With CEQA. hut the
Board of Zomng Appeals reversed after
l11e Auomcy General interceded <md argued that Land ~~(lSte Managemclll required a denial. The applicant l11en filed
suit, ;md as part of a settlement the city
council agreed to find the permit deemed
approved. This incident h;L~ prompted introduction n! lcgislatiun amending the
Act ( AB 2223 ). now pending, providing

tlwt a pctmn will only he <kx~med approved if the agency ha.\ compiled wil11
CEQA. (An interim hearin!.' on the bill
will he held 111 Sacr;uncntn on DcL·emhcr
17, jt)') I. Sec lfpcomin~:; Fl'ents. p 73.)
:\llhough the Act prm ides express
time pcnods and a limited 90-day cxtcn'ion for deemed approval. 1t is unclear
whether a court 1s JUSllfted in gralting a
hllling C\ mcept ontl) the Act. The intncate
interplay of adjudicatory ;md legislative
actmns in land usc entitlements Wtl\ BOt
cnv1sinncd by the Legislature, ;md the
lulling approach would breal11c some life
hack into the Act. While it would require
~mnc judicial enginecnng, the result
would be mure consistent with l11c legislative purposes ;md less drastic than ruling that tl1e time penodc, do not hegin running on penn it approvals untlllegislativc
actions arc complete.
THE THIRD BLOW: l>l'nial Of l>nl'
l'rot·css

One of the Iirsl qucsuons rmscd under
the Act was t11c nmstitutiOnality of
deemed approval in cases where permits
would otherwise require public notice
and opportunity for a hearing. The basis
lor conccm was Hom v Countv of Venlllra ( 1979) 24 C3d W5. 156 CR 718,
which held that public notice ;md opportunity for a hearing is required by due
process when approval of a parcel map
substantially affects the property rights of
tllhcr landowners. See also Kennedv ,.
Citv o( Hav-H urd ( 1980) 105 CA3d 953.
165 CR 132. In Palmer v Citv ol Ojai
( 1986) 178 CA3d 280, 223 CR 542, the
Second District Court of Appeal dismis~cd tl1e constitutional issue with relative case. Thb did twt go unnoticed (sec
9 CEB Real Prop L Rep 112 (July I Y86)),
;md three years later t11e Fourth District
Court of Appeal held the deemed approval section of the Act unconstitutional insolar <L<; it led to approval of applications
without provision for notice and opportumty for a he:uing to affected landowners.
Selinger v Citv Council ( 1YS9) 216 CA3d
259, 264 CR 4YY. However. before the
decision in Selinger cmne down, the Legislature. apparently une:L'>Y with the holding in Palmer. mnendcd Govt C ~65956
to address the due process concem. St<1t'>
1987. ch Y85.
As l11e Act now reads, l11e applicant is
given two alternatives to ohtain a deemed
approval in cases where the law requires
puhlic notice and hearing. The first (add-

c:J m I 982) requires tl1c filing of an action
under CCP ~ IOX5 (traditional m:mdanws) rcque~ting the supenor court to order the agencv to give notice. to hold the
hc;mng. or hnt1l. The action must be filed
:~t lc:L\t (l0 days before exp1ration of the
! nne limit resulting in deemed approvaL
The Act gives tl1e court no guidance on
tluw to proceed except to state that the
matter shall have preference over other
uvil actions and proceedings. Govt C
~(15956( al. The court should be able to
consider any issues that may he raised in
defense of application of the Act. such a.·;;
the agency's failure to have enacted necc~sary legislative approvals that arc a prerequisite to issu:mce of the permits.
The nl11er choice (added by the due
process mnendment in 1987) is for the
:tppl!r:mt to resort to a form of self-help
hv pmv1ding l11c public notice that the
law requires. The applicant must
the
agency at least seven days' advance notice of imentitm to provide tlle public noucc. Huwcvcr. the notice cannot be
earlier than 60 days after expiration of the
tunc at which deemed approval occurred.
TI1e reason for this requirement is not
clear. Probably it was meant to allow the
agency suflicient time to act on its own,
even after the deemed approval period
had rur1. The agency must provide the
applicant with the requirements for distribution of the public notice. Govt C
~65941.5. The contents of l11e nouce shall
include a description and the location of
the proposed development, the permit
application number, the name and address of the permitting agency, and a
~tatement that the project shall be deemed
approved if the permitting agency has not
acted within 60 days. The 60-day period
begins running from the date the notice is
g1ven. Govt C §65956.
Even t110ugh the Act was amended to
meet the due process requirement<; in
Horn v Count\' o{Ventura, supra, tbe language does not actually require a public
hearing or ensure the opportunity for one.
A notice given unilaterally hy the appli~
cant witlJOut more can hardly be said to
provide opportunity for a hearing. The
assumption seems to be that. once notice
is given. the agency will wake up or be
forced by its constituency to hold a hearing. lf it is inclined to do so, some additional notice will be required hecause the
applicant"-; notice will not set a time and
place for the hearing (unless tbis has been
worked out with the agency, which is un-
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likely hecause then the agency would
have noticed the heanng it<>ell). The st;ntHe states that; if l11c agency tails tn
spoml after the dcvdopa mitiates the IIPtice, the deemed approval will nccuc
The self-help remedy docs not
the due process dilemma. Under lfom 1
Cuwuv Ventura. supra. due proces.> fl'quircs opponumty for a hearing as \Ve II
as notice. Without a
heing scheduled. there is no opportunity for adjominl!
l;mdowners to ohject to a proJect. Thus.
an applicant may he forced to petition the
court to order a hearing. Regrettably. the
Act falls shtlrt 111 IHll authorizing such an
action after the applic:mt has pmndcd
puhlic notice. Nevertheless, \HJe is mclincd to hclieve that a court would impiy
amhority to order a puhlic hcanng at tile
applicant's request if the giving of nouce
did not prompt the agency to do so on Hs
own.
The hearing need not occur at any particular time to sattsfy due process. A recent case indicates that due process wtl!
be satisfied if project opponents arc
the opportunity to he heard hy a reviewing hody conductmg a de novo hearing on
an appeal of the deemed approval. Ci,mi
v San Diego Tmsr & Sal'. nank tScpL I'
1991,4 Civ DOI5057) 91 Daily Joumal
DAR 11309,91 RccordcrCDOS 74lX. In
Orsi v Citv Council. supra, seven puhl1c
hearings were held on the applicant's
phmned unit development <PUDl
withPU! action bein!.' t;tkcn wtl.hin the
applicahlc time pcrwd. Stating in a fontnote that tile retJUirements of notice and
hearing were not at Issue, the court found
that the pcnmt was deemed approved.
However, to satisfy due process, the nolice and puhlic hearing would have torelate to tile issuance of t11c pennir; it would
not he suflicicnt if the
was limited to some collateraJ aspect of
permining process, ~uch as ccruficatjon of
the EIR.
LINGERIN<; CONCERNS

Absence of Findin~JS
If notice and an opportunity for bearing arc given to adjmning landowners,
docs due process also require findings
based on suhstamial evidence to support
t11e approval'' The answer turns on
whether, witiwut findmgs, a court can adequately fC\ iew t11e approval. Nothin2 in
the Act is intended to preclude appeals ot
deemed approvals and the statutory appcnnns
prcntdcd for

Act) ;UJd the Act must he resnhed in favor of ti1e latter. But Selinger
he considered as having disdid not focus on

Land
li![)(lflga ;\ss 'n

Scenic Communi tv v

a

of Los An-

(! lJ74) II C3d 506, 1!3 CR 1\36.
The ahscncc elf
was not an
issue m Ors1. nur W<l'> it raised in Palmer
r Cirr
supra, the only otllcr case
upholding automatic approval under the
Act. However. it was the hao,is tor deor a temativc
deemed
suhdivisiun map under a pmvtsloll in tl1c
Suhd!vtsi1Hl \1ap Act (Gnvt C ~~664l<J.664lJ9.37). In Woodland Hills Residents
Counul (I
44 CA3d
a neighborhood association
a tentative subdivision
map un the ground that it was inconsis!Cnt with a
enacted mnendment
The map wa~
agency. On apcnmmission ;md city
hoth bodies were unable ttJ render a decision hccause tic votes. Under
the Subdivision Map Act and local ordimmcc tile effect of a !lc vote 1s to
the
and af!lnn the

were
that

of the map.
at
from t11e supreme court
decision in li!panga
'n j{!r a Scenic
Communitv
supra. the court held that linJings were
semial to enable the
to determine
on what basis to seek
and to apcoun of the basis for
prise the
t11e acuon.
The issue of findmgs as it relates to the
Act hw.; not gone completely unnoticed.
Il wm; hrietly discussed in Selinger.
court declined to follow Woodwhere
land Hills,
that the insoluble conllict between the
requirement\
uf various statutes (such m; the Subdivi-

emphasized
m tlJe land use
process and held that projecL<; lacking
such consistency cannot be deemed approved. Findings are critical to the consistency detennination. In
the
court h<L<;cd its decision on CCP :S 1094.5.
However, the
that t,f)e
requirement nf
tionally grounded as well. 111c supreme
cnurt nuted that its
ari~es from
"jud,t>e-made law" and finLl~ support in
consideration." Toa Scenic
'
Cuwuv
Los
(1974) 11 C3d
506, 515, !13 CR S36, 841. Faced with
the question, it would not be

for a Cllurt to rule that due process requires findings to support the approval
of
landowners arc
affected. The right
is no
important th<m notice and
opponumty for a
court's
on
challenge to the
should not he
the lack of findings.
DeNned Approval of What?
In
where the rights of
mvners arc affected, there appears to be
little left of deemed approvaL The applicant is hcst advised to go to court <md obuun an cmler
the agency to act
But when notice and hearing are not redue process, deemed approval
may still work, In these cases it is interto ask the question: Exactly what
is approvcJ when the time period has
nm' LL'iCs holding that permits have
hcen deemed approved are not helpful.
Ojai, supra, the
court rcvcr:-;ed
denying a petition for a wnt of mandate compelling approval of a subdivision map, conditional
use pcrmiL :md building permit The only
issue heforc the court was the constitutionality of the deemed approval provision of the Act. On remand, the trial court
determined based on the facts
was not cnutled to a

"deemed approval" status under the Act
In Ursi \' Citv Council. supra. the cnurt
found the PUD pennit that petitioners
had applied fur was approved under the
:\ct. Nothing was stated abom the detail:-.
uf the approval.
Deemed approval has many ramifications. Take the case of a subdivision map.
Is the map approved without conditions
or arc conditions implied ~o that it meets
requirements of the agency's subdivision
nrdin<u1Ce ., If the ordinance require"
:-.treets to be improved to a certain st<mdard. c;m the agency still requtre the subdivider to enter into a suhdiviston agreement and post bonds or other forms ot
security as provided in the Map Act? See
Govt C ~~66499-66499.10. Some commentators have suggested that agencies
would do well to draft st<mdard cunditions
applicable to deemed approvab. Wrighr.
AB 884: Streamlining the Pemw Process.
Office of Planning and Research (circa
1977-71\); Wilson, [)own Stream from
Streamlinmt:. 7CalLawb7!Aug.l91\/).
.\ud vvhat about the need to address specific conditions that may relate only tn the
particular development project. such as
mitigation me<L~urcs recommended in m1
EIR nr mitigated negative deciMation!
Do they automatically become condition'>'~ Can an ordinance reqmre that
deemed approvals incorporate recom·
mcndations of staff for dedicatitl!IS, exactions, :md otllcr cnnditions that arc made
in reviewing the applicauou 1 Could a city
even enact a ·pmson pdl" ordmancc that
would impose conditions on deemed apf:tr more nnert1us tll:m would normally apply 1 We can only ~peculate on
answers to t11ese questions because neither the courts nor t11c Leg1slature has
seen lit to grapple with the question of
\vhat "deemed approval" really me;ms.

WHAT ARE THE ANSWERS'!

Provide for the Art to apply to legislative decisions that ;trc site specific, i.e.
those that affect only the property fur
which ;m accomp;mying adJudicatorv
penmt is sought (t'.g., zoning). Require agencies to concurrently process
hoth legislative ;md adjudicatory entitlements that are site spccilic unless
infeasible. General pl;m mnendrnent-;
would be excepted from tl1ese provisions.
• Build in a tolling cuuccpt so tlmt when
delays occur in CEQA processmg or
cnacunelll nl neces:-.ary legislative
prereqUisites. the agency must act on
the penn it snon ( wtthin 30 days) after
such actions occur.
• ScuHie the idea nf deemed approval
when notice and opportunity tor he<tr·
ing arc requtred hy law. Provide for a
summ:try court procedure allowing
l11e applicant to quickly obtain an order requiring the agency to gi vc notice
and hold such a hc;tring (or be held in
cnntempO. ln l;u·ge counties, such
matters could he referred to referees.
Limit the defenses that can he raised
to whether the appllcahle time period
has run for the agency to act. Make tl1e
nrdcr nonappealable. ;.,o that it em
only he rcview~:d
~:xtraordinary
writ Allow the prevailing p:trty torecover reasonable attorney fees. A less
dcstrahle alternauve would he to pmvide for de novo hearings by reviewing court" on appeal of deemed approvals when nu hearings were
conducted hy the permming agency.

TI1e Act was born out of frustration. It
was a prote;,t against bureaucracy and for
that reason alone was wannly embraced.
But in attempting to force a solution simple in concept to remedy a problem, complex in scope, it was doomed
fail.
Lacking w:L'i a thoughtful integration of
the permitting process into long-;.,tanding
con~titution:ll principles inherent in admini,trativc law. Nor was its interaction
with the overall land u~e process any better thought out. As a rc~ult the JUdici:try
h;L<; h:lfllstrung the "deemed approval"
concept to the point where it is \trtually
mc:mmgless.
But all h<L" not been lost. The mecha·
nism for bringing closure to the application process through the concept of
"deemed completeness" appems to he inUtct. And even though judicial involvement may be required to gain a penn it approval, if this remedy um he expedited,
then t11c goals of the Act arc still part! y attainahle. The reality is that the problems
nf govemmental delay and inaction.
which the Act set out to cure, still remam.
ll1e t;L\k ahead, wl11ch mu~t be underwken
by the Lcgi\Iature, is to revitalize t11e Act
to meet thi:' challenge. The reasons to do
-.n h>dav are more pressing than in 1978.
TI1e political question is not one of growth
versus no growth because the Act in no
wav limits an agencv's ahilitv tn sav no.
Rather t11e questiOn is one of ·faimes.s . ./

General Reading
Wilson, Down Stream From Streamlining, 7 Cal Law 66 (Aug. 1987)

rium Does Not Toll The Permit Streamlining Acts' Time Limitations, Public

Contacts
David C. Nunenkamp,

Law News (Winter 1990).

Sahm, Project Approval Under the
California Environmental Quality Act: It
Always Takes Longer Than You Think, 19

Wright, AB 884: Streamlining The
Permit Process, Office of Planning and
Research (Circa 1977-78).

Santa Clara L Rev 579 (1979)

Other

Industry/Government Publications;
Studies; Reports; Position Papers
Curtin & Byrd, DevelopmentMorato·

Curtin & Wood, "Ambit of Permit
Streamlining Act Is Shrinking," Los An-

The Act may be dying, hut n 1s not
dead. Changes e<m be made legislatively
tn restore its vitality. Some suggestions
!Ill! ow.
•

geles Daily Journal (Oct 5, 1990).

•

!n CL\es not reqlllring notice :md opportunity tor a heanng, define what
"deemed approval" me;ms. Provide
for each agency to adopt standard condnions that shall apply in t11e case of
deemed approvah. provided those
cPwhtinns can be justified on the b<L\is
of hcaltll and

CONCLUSH>N

Deputy Director, and

Christine Kinne,
Assistant Deputy Director
Office of Permit Assistance
Office of Governor Pete Wilson
1400 lOth Street, Room 108
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 322-8515
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STATEMENT TO SENATE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONCERNING AB 2223

Robert E. Merritt
December 17, 1991

Madam Chairman and Committee Members:

My name is Robert Merritt.

I am a partner in the San

Francisco office of the law firm of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown &
Enersen.

I practice in the area of real estate and land use

and have authored books and articles on various land use
topics.

I am also an editor of the Land Use Forum, a

publication of the California Continuing Education of the Bar
which is a non-profit organization sponsored jointly by the
State Bar and the University of California.

I appreciate the

opportunity to appear before you today on the subject of the
Permit Streamlining Act.

My presentation consists of two parts.

First, I will

spend a few minutes briefing you on the Permit Streamlining Act
as a way of setting the stage for the testimony on AB 2223.
Toward the end of the hearing I will reappear to make some
concrete suggestions as to how the Permit Streamlining Act
could be improved.
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My remarks to

are

neutral

rather than advocate a particular view
to improve the Act.

I

ing

want to assist

of

the Permit Streamlining Act and

measures

might be

taken to restore its vitality.

As you are probably aware, the

of the Act when

enacted in 1977 was to create a more favorable business climate
in the State by setting a f

ite time frame

thin which

permits for development must be acted on.

The legislation was

not intended to shortcut environmental r

ew or limit

power of government--either state or local.
designed to "streamline" the process.
bureaucracy is nothing new--a

le frustration

r reform

most notable was the effort of Dow
petrochemical plant at Coll

permits.

this area.

The

ical to locate a

ille, a small town east of San

Dow spent two

million attempting unsuccess

th

of newsworthy incidents

gave rise to a surge of interest

Francisco.

It was simply

lf year
1

to

over $4.5
65 r

It finally gave up.

ir

the main stumbl

block for Dow was federal--not stat

rmits,

blame for

Dow's decision to abandon the project was placed on the state.
The result was enactment of the

t

rearnl

ing Act which

sailed through the legislature virtually unopposed and was
supported by development and environmental interests alike.
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HOW THE ACT IS SUPPOSE TO WORK!
I think of the Act as having two stages--the
application stage and the deemed approval stage.

The

application stage requires the agency to inform the applicant
for a development permit within 30 days whether or not the
application is complete.

In order to know what to submit, the

agency is required to keep current a list of information
required for submittals.

If the application is found not to be

complete, the agency must notify the applicant in writing as to
deficiencies.

If the agency fails to give notice of

deficiencies within the 30 day period then the application is
deemed complete.

Once the application is complete, either because the
agency notifies the applicant of that fact or the agency fails
to give notice, the second stage begins.
complicated.

This one is more

In its simplest terms, the agency must determine

what kind of environmental review is required under CEQA.

If

the project is exempt or can be processed under a negative
declaration, the agency is allowed a period of 180 days to
approve or deny the application.

If an EIR will be required,

the applicable time is one year.

These periods begin running

from the end of stage one--that is, the date that the
application is found to be complete or is deemed complete.

It

is possible to extend these time periods for up to 90 days with
the agreement of both the applicant and the agency.
54 37M
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If the agency fails to act within
year period, the project is deemed approved.

180 day or one

In theory

is

should allow the applicant to walk in, pick up the permit and
start construction.

However, things rarely work out that way.

Due process requires notice and opportunity for hearing for
many development permits before the permit application can be
approved.

In these cases the Act gives the applicant two

choices--go to court to order the agency to give notice and
hold a hearing or resort to self-help by giving public notice.
Among other things, the public notice must state that unless
acted upon in 60 days the application will be deemed approved.

We have not had much experience with applicants
obtaining deemed approval using either approach.
court can take a long time and is expensive.

Ther

Going to
ore, there

1s considerable incentive to using the self-help approach.
it has problems as well.

In a recent appellate

But

ision, the

court rejected an applicant's effort to obtain a deemed
approval using this self-help approach because the applicant
failed to give adequate notice. Ciani v San Diego Trust & Sav.
Bank (1991) 233 CA 3d 1604.

And, whether self-help can

overcome constitutional due process objections is yet to be
determined.
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WHAT HAS GONE WRONG?

There are four major problems which prevent the Permit
Streamlining Act from accomplishing the objective of speedy
processing of land use entitlements.

Most of these problems

have arisen out of litigation involving the Act.

1.

The Act does not apply to legislative actions

such as general plan amendments and zoning actions.

It applies

only to adjudicatory decisions such as issuance of use permits
and tentative subdivision map approvals.

This distinction was

drawn by the Court in Landi v County of Monterey (1983) 139
CA3d 934, which refused to apply the Act to the rezoning of 18
acres.

Since many projects require legislative action (e.g.

general plan amendments), these projects cannot move ahead
until the agency decides to act.

The Act provides no help in

expediting these legislative actions.

2. There can be no deemed approval under the Act
unless permit applications are consistent with the general plan
and other underlying legislative actions as required by state
law.

Various state laws require adjudicatory actions, such as

approval of tentative subdivision maps, to be consistent with
the local agency's general plan.

In Land Waste Management v

Board of Supervisors, (1990) 222 CA3d 950, the Court ruled that
adjudicatory permits (those subject to the Act) will not be
54 37M

Statement by Robert E. Merritt
Page 6

039

deemed approved unless these consi

requirements are met.

This means if an application for a tentative map requires
amendment of the general plan in order for consistency to
exist, there can be no deemed approval until that amendment has
occurred.

And we know from Landi that the local agency is

under no compunction to amend their general plan.

Thus the

whole mechanism for approval can get stalled indefinitely.

3. The Act may fail to meet constitutional due
process requirements by not providing an opportunity for a
hearing.

In Horn v County of Ventura (1979) 24 C3d 605, the

California Supreme Court held that a local agency must provide
notice and opportunity for hearing when land use decisions
substantially affect property rights of other landowners.

Two

cases have addressed this issue as it affects deemed approval
under the Act.

Palmer _v City of Ojai (1986) 178 CA3d 280,

found that the rule set forth in Horn did not apply to the
Act.

But in the later case of

Seli~er

v City Council (1989)

216 CA3d 259, the Court disagreed and found the deemed approval
provisions of the Act unconstitutional.

In 1987, the

legislature amended the Act to provide a means for the
applicant to give notice in order to obtain deemed approval.
But this amendment of the Act may not have gone far enough.
The notice does not guarantee an opportunity for a hearing and
without such an opportunity the deemed approval mechanism may
still be constitutionally flawed.
5437M
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The recent case of Ciani v San Diego Trust & Savings
Bank (1991) 233 CA3d 1604 involved an attempt to achieve a
deemed approval of a Coastal Act permit by utilizing these
notice procedures.

The Court found that no deemed approval had

occurred because the applicant failed to give notice to the
Coastal Commission.

Thus, the issue of whether deemed approval

could occur without an opportunity for a hearing did not
confront the court.

Nevertheless, in an interesting footnote

the Court observes that even had the notice been proper there
are still legitimate issues over rights of the public to object
to the approval and the lack of any findings upon which to base
an appeal of the approval.

4.

(See 233 CA3d at 1615, f. 4).

If deemed approval does work, it is not clear

exactly what has been approved.

In the case of most permits,

conditions will be attached by the agency which provide
standards of performance and mitigate environmental impacts.
Does a deemed approval simply allow the project to proceed
without any of the usual conditions designed to protect public
health and safety?
are they?

Are conditions to be implied?

If so, what

When improvement are to be constructed, do customary

design standards apply?
performance?

Can the agency require security for

Can the agency enact a standard set of conditions

that apply to all deemed approvals?

Could these standards be

more onerous than would otherwise apply to discourage deemed
approvals (a "poison pill")?
5437M

The Act fails to address any of

Statement by Robert E. Merritt
Page 8

these questions and the few cases that have found deemed
approvals have never probed these questions.

Nevertheless, if

the Act is to be made to work, these questions must be answered.
RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACT TO CEQA
The Permit Streamlining Act followed enactment of CEQA
by eight years.

Although the Act's time limitations turn on

the kind of environmental analysis required under CEQA, the Act
does not specifically address the possibility that a deemed
approval could occur before the CEQA process is complete.

CEQA

provides for a decision to be made on whether a negative
declaration or EIR will be required within 30 days after an
application is complete.

This time can be extended 15 days if

both the applicant and agency agree.
§

21080.2}.

(Resources Code

State CEQA Guidelines require that if a negative

declaration is required, it be completed within 105 days and if
an EIR is required it shall be certified within one year from
the time the application is complete.
§

15107, 15108).

(14 Cal Adrn Code

This time can be extended for an EIR if both

the applicant and the agency agree.

Also, if the applicant

delays the preparation of necessary environmental documents
these time limits do not apply.

If an extension of time is

given to complete the EIR, the Permit Streamlining Act deemed
approval date of one year no longer applies and the deadline
becomes 90 days after certification of the EIR.

Although CEQA

time lines are generally consistent with the Act, they are not
5437M
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CEQA does not provide any penalty for

missing deadlines, and for that reason the courts treat the
timelines as merely directory rather than mandatory.

(Meridian

Ocean Systems v State Lands Comm'n (1990) 222 CA3d 153).
Therefore it is quite easy to have the situation arise that
resulted in AB 2223--a deemed approval deadline, but no
completed EIR.

Under existing law it's not clear what happens

next.

In the Land Waste Management case, the Court rejects
the idea that the EIR can be deemed certified by expiration of
the time limits under the Act.

What the Court does not say,

but one can imply, is that without the EIR being certified the
project cannot be deemed approved.

AB 2223 says this in no

uncertain terms.

Two other alternatives to denying deemed approval for
lack of a certified EIR are mentioned in your briefing paper.
One is to impose a

one year deadline on preparation of an

EIR (and presumably a 180 day deadline on preparation of a
negative declaration) which would overrule the court's holding
on this issue in Land Waste Management.

The effect would be to

allow the project to go ahead without an EIR if it were not
completed.

A second approach is to toll or suspend the deemed

approval until a fixed time elapses (e.g. 45 days) after the
CEQA process is complete.
5437M
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similar situation--the failure of

agency to take

legislative actions that are prerequisites to permit issuance.
I anticipate you will hear the pros and cons of these
approaches in the testimony that follows.

This concludes my

briefing and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
PART 2

In my opening remarks I pointed to many of the
problems with the current Permit Streamlining Act--that it does
not operate as to legislative actions, the conflict with state
law consistency requirements, due process concerns, not knowing

what deemed approval means and, of course, the CEQA concern
that is the focus of AB 2223.

I would like to leave you with

some suggestions.

to whether the cone

Thought should be g
"deemed approval" is real

the best enforcement

of
ism.

I

am sure it was initially favored because it seemed quick and
efficient, but to the contrary it
proved unworkable.

s become complicated and

I suggest eliminating "deemed approval" and

replacing it with a summary judicial proceeding.

In other

words, if the agency fails to meet its deadline for taking
action under the Act, following reasonable notice to the
agency, the applicant could petition the court to issue a
premptory writ of mandate directing the agency to act on the
application.
5437M
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petition and response, limit the issues to whether the time
limits under the Act had been exceeded, and allow the court to
summarily issue the writ directing the agency to act after
affording the agency the opportunity to respond.

The court

could issue the writ based on pleadings and affidavits without
oral argument.

The order could be made non-appealable.

If

successful, the applicant should be awarded attorney's fees and
the court could be authorized to award a multiple of these fees
in cases where the agency acted capriciously in disregarding
the time lines under the Act.

Compelling the agency pursuant to court order to take
action puts teeth into the Act and eliminates the concerns that
have plagued deemed approvals.

To insure CEQA compliance, the

court's order would require the agency to complete and certify
the EIR or adopt the negative declaration, as appropriate,
within the time set for acting on the permit.

In setting a

time within which the agency must act, the court can consider
reasonable requests for extensions to comply with CEQA.

The

action taken by the agency could then be reviewed on appeal as
with any administrative decision and permit approvals would be
conditioned to require adherence to standard requirements of
the agency.

The key to this approach is to fashion the

judicial remedy so that it is limited to a single issue (i.e.
compliance with time limits), readily available and results in
cost to the agency for dragging its feet.
5437M
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A more moderate proposal would be to keep deemed
approval, but allow it to be invoked only
been held.

a hearing has

The Act now provides for this alternative, but

pursuing the action under standard mandate procedures is
expensive and time consuming.

Providing a summary form of

judicial mandate action and taxing the cost to the agency as I
have described would encourage its use.

The problem is that

if, after holding a hearing, the agency still does not take
action the difficulties with deemed approval still remain.

Another way the Act can be strengthened is by
eliminating the legislative versus adjudicatory distinction
created by Landi.

While the Act should probably not compel

action on general plan amendments because they frequently raise
broad policy issues of consequence to an entire community, it
should be made to apply to applications for legislative actions
that are site specific, such as a rezoning requests relating to
a particular parcel for which development permits are requested.

Finally, I think there are some other ways in which
the Act can be improved--if you will, "streamlined."

It would

help to prescribe a standard cover page applicable to
applications under the Act, to eliminate as a prerequisite for
the Act to apply that the applicant submit a signed statement
indicating whether the project is located on any listed
hazardous waste site, and to provide for a standard submittal
54 37M
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package when the agency has failed to develop the required list
of information for applications.

If deemed approval remains in

the Act, then agencies should be required to adopt measures
defining what it means.

Most significantly, the whole

entitlement process can be streamlined if efforts are made to
simplify the CEQA process.

I believe this can be done without

sacrificing protection of the environment, but that is the
subject for a different day.
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Presentation to Senate Committee on
Local Government
by
Franklin P. Eberhard
Chief Deputy Director of Planning
on
Permit Streamlining Act Issues
AB 2223 (Moore)
Honorable Committee Members - Good afternoon.
I am Franklin Eberhard, Chief Deputy Director of Planning For the City of
Los Angeles.
Thank you very much for asking me to speak to you on this matter. I am
aware that time is limited so I will make my comments short.
Briefly, the City of Los Angeles believes there is a strong need to amend
the Permit Streamlining Act in order to carry out spirit and intent of the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The current act requires
approval or disapproval of a project within one year if an EIR is required
or within 6 months if a negative declaration is issued. If an action is not
taken with in these time limits and the applicant chooses to avail himself
of the provisions of the current permit streamlining act, the project is
"deemed approved by operation of law". For a jurisdiction of our size
and complexity these time limits are too stringent when projects which
are environmentally controversial or complex are being considered. Our
reasons for concern are outlined as follows:
1. Issues which are extremely complex or controversial are often not
quickly resolved. The six month time limit on negative declarations
Page 1 of 5 Pages
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does not adequately allow for preparation of a full initial study,
publishing the results, receiving comment, responding to public
comment and or redoing and publishing of a new initial study and
negative declaration. This process can take up to 6 months or more
to accomplish if the issues are sufficiently complex and full review by
applicant, public agencies and the public as intended by CEQA is
accomplished. If not appropriately settled pursuant to CEQA rules,
then appeals and litigation relating to CEQA compliance can delay a
project for lengthy periods of time defeating the purpose of the
Permit Streamlining Act.
2. A project which is "deemed approved by operation of law" before
public input and hearings on the entitlement process occur effectively
denies neighbors and an impacted public effective input into the
decision making process.
3. A project which is "deemed approved by operation of law" may not be
thoroughly reviewed an exactions imposed on it which would normally
be required of it by the local government. By this I mean adequate
traffic control measures, street lights, street trees, fire hydrants
and the like all necessitated by the project might not be required
except those which would normally be required by the building permit
process. This is particularly important where significantly adverse
environmental impacts might result unless adequate mitigations are
required of the project during the entitlement process.
Amending the Permit Streamlining Act to provide that a project be
deemed to be approved by operation of law if the local jurisdiction does
not act on the matter within the times now specified by the law or within
60 days of completion of the final environmental clearance which ever
comes last would solve this problem.
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I would like briefly to describe to you the background from which I am
addressing you.
The City of Los Angeles Planning Department
processes approximately 14,000 discretionary actions in a busy year
ranging from simple plan or site plan approvals to extremely complex
projects involving many complex entitlements. All involve some form of
environmental clearance. Of those 14,000 actions about 25 require
and another 1200 acquire either a negative declaration or mitigated
negative declaration. While seeking to comply with CEQA, both as to the
letter of the law and to its spirit and intent, the City struggles
produce environmental actions suitable to each project in an expeditious
and efficient manner. We have been quite successful in this endeavor as
to the processing of negative declarations and are still struggling with
the production of EIRs in a more timely manner.
We have, however, been impacted by the Permit Streamlining Act. The
provisions of the act were invoked on a property located in the Venice
Community of Los Angeles at 601 Ocean Front Walk. The project is
described as a 3 story 18,925 square foot shopping center with 152
on-site parking spaces. The applicant requested a project permit under a
current interim control ordinance, a yard variance requesting a zero foot
setback on a side yard, a zone variance to permit compact parking
spaces in excess of the maximum number established by the Municipal
Code, a conditional use for a mini-mall and a conditional use to sell
All were combined into one
alcoholic beverages for on-site consumption.
proceeding and environmental clearance. The project is located in an
extremely congested area which also experiences severe off-street
parking problems.
A number of valid issues were raised by opponents of the project
challenging the mitigated negative declaration issued by the Planning
Department. They included the following:
Page 3 of 5 Pages
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1. Analysis of the impacts caused by traffic generated by the project.
2. Adequacy of analysis of cumulative impacts in the traffic study of
this and neighboring projects in the traffic study which is a part of
the initial study leading to a mitigated negative declaration for the
project.
3. Adequacy of off-street parking provided by the applicant.
4. Noise created by the project and its impact on surrounding residents.
Resolution of these issues caused the retrieval of the original mitigated
negative declaration and the issuance of a second negative declaration.
The time taken to resolve these issues exceeded the six months
allocated to do so by the permit streamlining act for such processes.
While clearly the City's handling of the matter is also at issue in this
matter, the legitimate environmental controversy engendered by this
case caused delays which exceeded those allowed.
After after 17 months of the application having been deemed complete
by the City, the applicant exercised his right to have the project "deemed
approved by operation of law" and the Zoning Administrator adhered to
his request on advice of the City Attorney. The matter was then
appealed to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals who granted the appeal
and reversed the Zoning Administrator's action. The applicant filed suit
against the City which was subsequently settled by the City and applicant
granting the requested project entitlements. The project being located
in the California Coastal Zone was then required to acquire a coastal
development permit from the Coastal Commission which was granted
with conditions by that Commission. The matter, however, is not over
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City's
because local residents have challenged
suit in court. The matter is still being litigated.
Again I would like to impress on
the City's and my belief
Permit Streamlining Act needs be amended so as to permit full
examination and review of project in accordance with CEQA. To fail to do
so would defeat both the aims of CEQA and permit streamlining act due
to there inherent conflicts with each other. Amending the Permit
Streamlining Act to provide that a proiect be deemed to be approved by
operation of law if the local jurisdiction does not act on the matter within
the times now specified by the law or within 60 days of completion of the
final environmental clearance which ever comes last would solve this
problem.
Thank you very much for your attention. I would
any questions which
might have on
matter.
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Re:

Assembly Bill 2223 (Moore)
Permit Streamlining Issues

Merr~ers

of the Corrmittee:

le :or Livable and Active neighborhoods in Los .;ngeles,
PLAN/LA, is a coalition of over 150 neighborhood groups stretching
across Los .;ngeles from Sun Valley to San
In the matter
before you, we are specifical
representing the ?ederation of
Hillside Emd Canyon .:,.ssociations,
cely 50 homeowner
associations locat
in the Hol
Hills and the Santa Monica
Hountains.
We are here i:1 support of the proposed amendraent
(AB2223) to the law known as the "Permit Streamlining Act".

*

CEQA must come first

*

Community groups cannot
resolve eve~ issue

*

Due Process for adjoining property owners must be
protected, including appeal options

rely

on

the

courts

to

l:ll·mj_y l:elieve that no permit applicati:::m ~hould be "deemed
app
" r::riol· to the completion of the CSQ.::. process and notice of
such corr.p le:::. ion has been lawfully filed.
Co::.:c:unl c::· gro·~ps r:1us t
1-el:/ 1-~ec~. ·~l-1'" 0.:1 rhe r:ro\liSlon.s of ~he Cali£cr~~:a 2nviror1rnental
Quality .:..c:
t.CE(.:'\)
for proteccion. :ror;; signi:icant irr.pacts
emanating :r:m de~elcpment prOJects. :~e a en t lD a posltlon, as
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AB 2::23
::Jecer:wet·
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nize each and every
volunteer organ1:::::at1ons, to careful
then, if an issue
application before a local jurisdiction,
ar1ses, to be forced to s
relief from +-'court in cases where
manner.
the local agency fails to act in a time
It is essential, as underscored by the Oceanfront ~~alk case, that
act be clarified to provide for full CEQA compliance prior to any
such "deemed approval".
In the staff a1scussion of
alternative approaches, we come down on the side of the
First" option.
It is our opinion that CEQA requires compliance
prior to any discretionary action on the part of a local agency as
v;as implied in the Land h'aste Management case.
We do not believe that the same deadlines can
used in both CEQA
and the Streamlining .L.ct. lJo penalties are provided for failure to
comply with the deadlines indicated in CEQA.
In practice, most
complicat
EIR's require a
nimum of 12 months to prepare and
many extend vJell beyond that t
frame.
Allowing the one year
limit contained in
Streamlining Act to stand would result in
numerous major projects
ing deemed approved without mitigation,
forcing the courts to step in and attempt to determine mitigation
after the fact.
Com.rnunity groups must not
placed in
position of relying en the courts to deal wi
individual cases.
In response to this very issue, the City of Los Angeles will not
deem an application complete until the CEQA process
completed.
Tolling 1s a possible solution to this dilemma. \·Je would advocate
that
one year clock be suspended at such c
as
local
ager: __: -:-;
"' L t
EIR ::..s necessar.1.
The <:lock could be
restarted once the
ft EIR is released for public comment, or
after the final EIR 1s relaeas
would allow sufficient time
for the agencies t
1 with the application.
e ·,:e support I""B2223 in i t
at t em;,J t s
l
th this narrow
issue, it
es not
s the many
problems
th the Act.

~-Jhi l

Due Process
It appears that in cases involving t
due process rights of other
parties in interest, the applicant cannot rely on the St~eamlining
Act i~ seeking an app~oval, wit
t notice
a hearing. However,
the .-:__c- (or c:his proposed a:-r,endinent)
es not clari
what happens
if ncc:ice is given and a hearing is held, yet the agency still
fai:s :o ct.
The
ence of findings and cc~diticns in such a
approval" do not appear to be worth mu
whi
is as it
clarified t:o remove su
cases :rem c:ne purv~ew of the legislacion enti~e

O~ill
t\B

2~:

23

De=(~:c:icer
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Hence we are left ~ith "ministerial" reviews, wn1cn in the City of
Los Angeles, ~ow revolves around a process called Site Plan Review.
The language of the Act as written still does not deal with the
question of findings or conditions that might apply to projects
"deemed ::~pproved".
Hence appeals rights that accrue to the
neighbors in any subsequent dispute may be compromised.
It is obvious that the Streamlining Act must be compatible with
CEQ.;;., or our environ.rnental protection laws ·will be severely
compromised. It is also fair to say that some degree of certainty
must be imposed on the permitting system.
Ideally the law should
mandate notice, a hearing and a decision on any development
application within one year.
Two alternatives are available to a.cn1eve this. The first option
would allow this time frame to
tolled at the point of
determina.tion of the need for a. mitigated negative declaration or
an EIR. The clock would restart upon publication of the mitigated
negati?e declaration or the release of the Final EIR.
The second
option would :allow the L.Z\ City Planning model which presently
req'.Jires CEQA to be complete before an applicacion is deemed
con;plete.
Both could apply to projects involving d·..1e process, as
well as "ministerial" applications.
The issues of mandating a hearing, findings and conditions then
become more acute.
Nitigations contained in the CEQ.Z... clearance
sho~:ld automatically become conditions.
Standard findings and
conditions should also prevail in any "deemed approval".
In :::.he ~ nter
J\B2 2 2 3 i)•1oore)

se issues can also
we remain 1n support of

Sincerely,

}'EOPLE FOR
lJIVABLE AND
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in the near future.
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Member Organizations
Updated October 19, 1991
Brentwood Community Federation
Handeville Canyon Association
Lower Mandeville Canyon Association
Brentwood Hills Association
Brentwood Homeowners Association
Brent~ood Terrace Homeowners Association
Crestwood Hills Association
South Brentwood Homeowners Association
Sullivan Canyon Property Owners Association
Coastal Area Support Team (COAST)
Villa Marina Council
Villa Marina East
Presidents Row Neighborhood
Venice Town Council
Zanja Neighborhood Residents Association
Vista Del Mar Neighborhood ~ssociation
FLi
of Ballona Wetlands
Homeowners Organized to Nonitor the Enviromenc
Del Rey Homeowners Association
East Los Angeles
Neighborhood Action

Co~mittee

Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations
Bel Air Association
E:~l

7-:.ir Knol2.s

Ber-.~.::..r

SK:.,·c::.-~st

Benedict Canyon .?J,ssociation
~ever:y Cres: ~cmec~ners Association
Beverly Glen Park

(HOME)

OS7
PLAN/LA

l·~erncership

Updated October 19,
?age 2

?,)_;tet·
~991

Beverly Highlands Homes Association
Briar Summit Homeowners Association
Briarcliff Improvement Association
Cahuenga Pass Property Owners Association
Casiano Estates Homeowners Association
Coldwater Canyon
Curson Canyon
Echo Park Improvement Association
Encino Property Owners
Franklin Hills Residents Association
Franklin-Hollywood Blvd. West
Friends of Caballero Canyon
Glassell Park Improvement Association
Glenridge Homeowners Association
Homeowners of Encino
The Highland's Owners Association
Hillside Village Property Owners Association
Hollywood Crescent
Holl~vood Dell Civic Association
Hollywood Heights Association
Hollywood Hills Inmprovement Association
Hollywood Knolls Community Club
Holl~voodland Improvement Association
Lake Hollywood Homeowners Association
Laurel Canyon Association
Lookout Mountain Associates
Los Feliz Improvement Association
Miramar Homeownwers Association
Mountaingate Community Association
Mt. Olyrr,pes ;rope:rt:y Owners .;ssociation
Mt. Washington Association
Mulholland Property Owners Association
North Beverly Dr. Franklin Canyon Association
Nichols Canyon Association
Outpost Homeowners Association
Pacific Palisades Residents Association
Residents of Beverly Glen
Roscomare Valley Association
Sherman Oaks Homeowners Association
Studio City Residents Association
Sunset Plaza Civic Association
Tarzana Property Owners Association
The Eagle Rock Association (T.E.R.A.)
Topp of the Canyon Association
Torreyson/Flynn Association
~hitley Hei
ts Ci~ic Association
Wonderland Park ~eighborhood Assoc ation
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11pdated Octcber 19, 1J 1
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LA Crusaders
CAN Community Action Network
NAC Neighborhoods Against Crime
COBRA Citizen Opposing Burglary Robbery & hssault
Friends of St. Basil's Church
Inner City Alliance
Pico Union Housing Corporation
HollyNOOd-Wilshire Committee on Aging
Helrose Hill North End Committee
Brezee Foundation
Drexel Avenue Neighborhood Watch
Rampart Rangers
East Hollywood Neighborhood vJatch
vlilshire Center Community Involvement Associat:.ion
Mid-Cities

Baldwin Hills Neighborhood Homeowners Association
Kinney Heights Homeowners Association
Western Heights Neighborhood Association
Country Club Park Neighborhood Asocciation
San Fernando Valley Federation
.

...
~o~eo~ners

'

o: ~nc~no
Sunland-Tujunga Association of Residents
~~n Nuys Homeowners Association
Hansen Hills Homeowners Association, Inc.
Lakeview Terrace Improvement ll.ssociation
Lakeview Terrace Homeowners Association
Porter Ranch is Developed Enough (PRIDE}
Pacoima Property Owners Association, Inc.
Northridge Civic Association
North Valley Homeowners Federation
North Hollywood Residents Association
'IJes t Hills Cominuni ty Organization
?,eseda Community Association
S.T.O.?. of North Hollywood
Valley Village Homeowners Association
Friends of Caballero Canyon
"'."a l : ~jr :: ors ecv.:I1E: 2:.~ .s ,.::..:= SC'C.: .:t t _:_ sn.
"

~-.
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~<-~:-.::c;,_-s~ip
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;;.,:::.:t
:
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~

San Pedro & Penninsula Homeowners Coalition

Barton Hill
Courtyards
El :=rado
Lelc.nd Park
Hire. Catalina
Mirc.flores Park
Palisades
Fales Verdes Shores
Point F'ermin
Rol~ing Hills Riveria
San Pedro Harbor
San ?edro Highlands
Sou:~ Shores
Tenr::::.s Club
\'leSt:-:'tOnt
RPV Homeowners Council
South East Central Homeowners Assocition, Inc.
Westside Civic Federation

Beverly ~~.ngeles
Beverly Roxbu1y
Beverly Wilshire Homes Association
3e.,;~:: 2.~~~.-.~ood

:-:c·rneo-.'v"~~el:'s

~:... s soc ia. t

i

0:1

CaL.::':ornia Countr_1 Club Homeovmers Associat.ion
Car:~ay Circ~e Homeowners Association
Che'v·:::.ot Hills Homeovmers Jl.ssociation
Holcby :·:est·,;ood Property Owners Association
Melrose Action Coalition
Miracle Mile Residential Association
Roxbury- Beverwi 1
Sout~ Carthay Neighborhood Association
South of Burton Way Association
Tract. 7260
West~ood Gardens Civic Association
Westwood South of Santa Monica
~es:side Village Civic Associc.tion
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Wilmington

Banning Park Neighborhood Association
Wilmington Home Owners
New Wilmington Committee
L.A. Harbor Boat Owners
WIN Neighborhood Association
Wilmington North Neighborhood Association
Wilshire Homeowners Alliance

Brookside Homeowners Association
Fremont Place Association
Hancock Park Homeowners Association
Larc0~ont Village Homeowners Association
Windsor Square Association
Windsor Village Association
Boulevard Heights Homeowners Association
Oxford Square Association
Ridgewood-Wilton Neighborhood Association
Others

Elysian

Valley

.~ssociation

Property

Owners,

Renters

& Businessmen's
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statement Submitted to the
Senate Local Government Committee
on Assembly Bill 2223
December 17, 1991
Senator Bergeson and Committee Members:
There is not a shred of doubt that the legislature should
clarify the relationship between the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) and the Permit Streamlining Act. The
existing ambiguity virtually assures needless litigation, which
creates higher costs to project proponents and invites
inconsistent results. There is no reason to postpone action
until a nuclear power plant or a toxic waste incinerator is
"deemed approved" with no safety conditions.
The ambiguity must be resolved by making compliance with
CEQA a condition precedent to the application of the Permit
streamlining Act. The CEQA process serves two critical
purposes that would be subverted by any other solution. First,
the public would lose its "privileged position" in the
environmental review process, since a deemed approval
effectively cuts off public input -- in some instances, before
there has been any opportunity whatsoever for public review of
a project. This would further erode trust in our governmental
institutions at a time when we can ill afford this.
Second, the agency (and indirectly, the public) would lose
the ability to impose mitigation measures to counter the
adverse environmental impacts of a project. Because the Permit
Streamlining Act does not provide any means for imposing
mitigation measures on a permit that is "deemed approved," full
compliance with CEQA is critical if appropriate mitigation
measures are to be imposed on projects that are approved under
the Permit Streamlining Act.
By limiting "deemed approval" to cases in which the agency
has completed the CEQA process, AB 2223 in effect adopts a
variation of the tolling concept advocated by Robert E. Merritt
in "The Permit Streamlining Act: The Dream and the Reality," 1
Land Use Forum 30 (1991). Once the applicable deadline under
the Permit Streamlining Act has passed, the agency should be
required to act on the project application(s) within a short
time after it certifies the EIR, approves the negative
declaration, or takes other action to complete its CEQA review.
The post-CEQA time period can be fairly short; 45 to 90 days
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should allow the agency sufficient opportunity to consider the
applications in light of the information provided through the
environmental review process.
The crocodile tears shed by project applicants over the
delays in environmental review do not bring much sympathy from
the public, which is often forced to wait years beyond the time
limits of the Permit Streamling Act for action on broad policy
documents, such as General and Specific Plans, that will affect
thousands of people. For example, efforts to adopt a Local
Coastal Plan for the Venice area have taken over four years.
Work on a Specific Plan for the Maxella-Glencoe area is in its
third year even though there is no public controversy -- the
homeowners, renters, business owners and property owners have
worked together to reach concensus on both goals and
implementation.
The public has no equivalent to the Permit Streamlining
Act. We must simply wait until the environmental review of our
General Plans, our Coastal Plan, and our Specific Plans
is completed by the various departments of the responsible
public agency. Adding a firm deadline to the CEQA timeline
would statutorily place the interests of the development
community ahead of the interests of the public at large. This
is not good public policy.
A stringent deadline for completing the CEQA process also
ignores the reality that the larger a project, and the more
adverse its impacts, the longer the CEQA review takes. As an
example, a critical aspect of the EIR is the requirement that
the lead agency respond to comments on the draft document.
This gives the public "an opportunity to test, assess, and
evaluate the data and make an informed judgment as to the
validity of the conclusions to be drawn therefrom." Sutter
Sensible Planning, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 122 Cal.App.3d
813, 822 (1981). Those projects with the most negative impacts
-- for example, a toxic waste incinerator -- are likely to
require a relatively longer amount of time to prepare the
required "reasoned response" than projects such as an apartment
complex. It is simply not reasonable to require that all EIR's
be completed within one year.
What will happen if you require strict compliance with the
CEQA time guidelines for every project, and the penalty for
delay is deemed approval? The most environmentally damaging
projects will be most likely to be deemed approved.
Moreover, the opposite rule -- allowing a deemed approval
under the Permit Streamlining Act without CEQA compliance -could actually have the unexpected consequence of increasing
the likelihood that project approvals would be overturned.
Such a rule would lengthen the time in which a project opponent
could file a CEQA challenge: instead of the 30-day statute of
limitation that governs lawsuits for projects with either EIR's
or negative declarations, project opponents would have 180 days
to file a lawsuit under the statute of limitation that governs
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CEQA challenges when the agency has not complied with CEQA. The
shorter statute of limitation,
with the fact that it
is generally
icult for an opponent to overturn an
EIR, means
project applicant might
off waiting for
laggardly agency to finish
than to risk a
suit that is likely
overturn the deemed
approval.
Finally, there is enough litigation over environmental
disputes without adding "CEQA vs. The Permit Streamlining Act."
All of the potential cases with this subheading could be
resolved in advance with the passage of this bill.
I would suggest two improvements to AB 2223. First, the
bill should establish a specific event that signals the end of
the environmental review.
This will prevent the otherwise
inevitable litigation over whether an agency has "complied with
CEQA" as of any given date.
Most important, the Permit Streamlining Act must specify
that a "deemed approval 11 includes both 1) the standard
conditions that are normally imposed by an agency (such as a
school impact fee) and 2) the conditions or mitigation measures
identified during the CEQA process.
These conditions are at the heart of the public interest.
They range from critical policy matters, such as requiring the
replacement of lost affordable housing, the funding of
transportation mitigations and the use of permeable paving
materials to reduce water-polluting urban run-off, to more
subtle issues that directly a
the quality of life for both
project residents and tenants and their neighbors, such as
landscape buffers, reasonable operating hours, and providing
room for recycling containers.
It is meaningless to require completion of CEQA review
before deemed approval if the results are not going to be used
for something.
I urge you to address the issue of conditions,
adopt the tolling concept with respect to CEQA compliance, and
pass a bill resolving these
before this state wastes
more of its resources in unnecessary litigation.
Thank you for your consideration of these concerns.
Sincerely,

Debra L. Bowen
cc:

Assemblywoman Gwen Moore
Councilwoman Ruth Galanter
Frank Eberhard, Acting Planning Director, City of Los
Angeles
Mr. John Powers, COAST
Mr. Bill Christopher, PLAN-LA

Oti4

SHERMAN L. STACEY
Attorney at Law
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December 17, 1991

The Honorable Marian Bergeson
Chairman
Senate Committee on Local Government
Room 2085, State Capitol
Sacramento, California 94248

Dear Senator Bergeson:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify with regard to
Assembly Bill 2223 relating to amendments to California
Government Code §65956, the operative provision of the law
commonly known as the Permit Streamlining Act.
I represent
Stephen M. Blanchard, an individual whose plans for development
of property in the Venice area of the City of Los Angeles, seems
to be the catalyst for this legislative change.
I believe that
the legislative change which is sought in this bill is not in the
best interest of the people of the State of California.
The Permit Streamlining Act was adopted in 1977.
It
was introduced by then Assembly Speaker McCarthy and passed with
bipartisan support and was signed by Governor Brown.
In his
press release of October 2, 1977, the Governor stated:
This measure required early cooperation between state
and local agencies on major projects; sets a one-year
deadline for lead agency permit decisions; and
consolidated public hearings and environmental impact
documents.
AB 884 helps guarantee that every proposed
development receives a prompt and fair hearing and
meets the governor's 1975 commitment to "cut through
the tangle of overlapping environmental and land use
rules which delay needed construction."
The purpose for which the Permit Streamlining Act was adopted is
as important today as it was in 1977 and the proposed legislation
would effectively negate the Permit Streamlining Act entirely.
Assembly Bill 2223 would require that no permit could
be deemed approved unless a final action has been taken on a
negative declaration or an environmental impact report.
Therefore, although there are time limits for completion of these
processes under the California Environmental Quality Act, there
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is no penalty for the failure to meet such ime deadlines. Only
the Permit Streamlining Act prov des any effective measure to
compel state or local government to act in a timely manner. Only
the existence of the Permit Streamlining Act over the past 14
years has resulted in timely decisions.
AB 2223 would remove
this incentive for the government to act timely.
When the Permit Streamlining Act was passed, the
impetus for the law was the failure of the state and local
agencies to be able to determine whether or not to grant a permit
for the construction of an important industrial plant which
ultimately became located in another state.
Rather than
discourage needed development for the citizens of this State, the
Permit Streamlining Act assured those who would expend the
substantial sums necessary to apply for permits that they would
receive prompt action by the government.
The Enrolled Bill
Report prepared for the Governor by the Resources Agency on
September 27, 1977 stated that the subject was "speeding up the
permit and CEQA process" and stated clearly "[i]f an agency fails
to act on an application within the time limit required, that
agency's permit would be automatically approved."
My experience is a clear basis on which the
effectiveness of the Permit Streamlining Act can be assessed. On
my client's behalf r filed an application to build
small
commercial project on a C-2 zoned property in the Ci
of Los
Angeles.
Due to the complexi
of the City's ordinances, six
separate discretionary permits were required (alt
all
permits are consolidated into a single hearing process).
Four
permit applications were filed on October 13, 1988.
The City
notified us that two additional applications were required and
those were filed on anuary 13, 1989 and all applications for the
project were deemed complete
the City on that date.
A public hearing was held on April 10, 1989.
Public
notice was given to all surrounding owners and tenants. Many
people attended the hearing. More than a year later, the City
had still not acted on the permit. The reason for this delay was
that the environmental review process had not been completed.
Although the City proposed a mitigated negative declaration on
October 11, 1989, opponents of the project insisted that an
environmental impact report was required.
(The City also failed
to include all permits in the mitigated negative declaration.)
The City examined the objections and issued a new mitigated
negative declaration on February 7, 1990. The opponents
continued to object and appealed this decision.
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On May 5, 1990, with no decision having been reached, I
demanded that the City comply with the Permit Streamlining Act
and deem our permits approved so that we could then proceed to
the California Coastal Commission.
The City Attorney agreed. The
City Board of Zoning Appeals disagreed.
The project stalemated
for another year until the City settled the dispute by agreeing
to issue the permits. An appeal to the Coastal Commission ensued
which approved the project with conditions on November 14, 1991.
Still dissatisfied, project opponents have continued with
litigation and tomorrow will seek a preliminary injunction in Los
Angeles Superior Court. More than three years after filing his
applications (which were only filed after a year of meetings with
community groups), the property owner is still unable to build.
Why does this set of circumstances exist? It is
because opponents to development are willing to exploit unfairly
the environmental laws of this State to delay and (hopefully like
Dow Chemical) defeat the development not through a decision but
through the absence of a decision.
Without a time limit like
that in the Permit Streamlining Act, these activities will be
encouraged. The Permit Streamlining Act is not directed at the
time occupied for making a decision on a project but rather at
the time for environmental review.
It is during this period that
overstated objections, false and misleading information, unfair
characterizations and conclusions and other charges are levelled
at a project. Under CEQA each objection requires analysis and
review, even if without merit.
Even when the initial
environmental reviewer reaches a conclusion, he can be bombarded
with objections to his conclusion and ultimately an appeal on the
environmental document alone.
A determination to issue a negative declaration is
almost always challenged in a controversial project on the
grounds that an environmental impact report should be prepared.
Most cities and counties, like the City of Los Angeles, do not
finalize the environmental determination except in conjunction
with the action on the permit itself. Therefore, every delay in
an environmental process becomes a delay in the permit process.
How does the Permit Streamlining Act cure these
problems.
By placing a time deadline under which all parties
must operate, the City is compelled to adopt procedures which
result in prompt decision making. A file cannot sit on a
planners desk for weeks because he does not want to deal with a
controversial issue. Opponents to projects must be economical in
their objections.
Not every project has catastrophic
environmental effects. However, to read a sample of the
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objections to my client's project, you would think it were a
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and not a commercial project in a
commercial zone.
Opponents will be discouraged from badgering
City employees who make decisions they do not like. Opponents
will have an equal interest in the prompt decision and will stop
debating procedural or impact issues which are truly
insignificant and deal with the real policy issues which are
raised by a development.
Before the Committee acts it should inquire as to
whether or not the effect of the present Permit Streamlining Act
has resulted in unwarranted or harmful development.
If the best
those who wish to amend the law can point to is one small
commercial building in a commercial zone in the City of Los
Angeles (a commercial building which met the strenuous
requirements of the California Coastal Commission) then there
seems little reason for a change.
Indeed, the Committee should
be congratulating itself that the Permit Streamlining Act worked
as expected.
The law should be left alone.

~t~yours,
SHERMAN
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Senator Marian Bergesen, Chair
Senate Committee on Local Government
State Capitol
Room 2085
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Senator Bergesen:
Since its inception the Permit Streamlining Act has conflicted with the California
Environmental Quality Act. Recent examples which will be discussed at this hearing include
the City of Los Angeles City Council's attempts to review staff CEQA determinations and
its status as respondent in lawsuits filed by both applicants and project neighbors. The City
of Sausalito is also litigating issues of the conflicts between CEQA and the Permit
Streamlining Act. There, a project was deemed approved despite expert agency comments
on an Environmental Impact Report that the applicant's project was so poorly designed that
human lives could be lost from geologic failure. Finally, a recent decision involving the City
of San Diego demonstrates that a literal reading of the Permit Streamlining Act may result
in an impermissible deprivation of third party due process rights. (Ciani v. San Diego Trust
& Savings Bank 233 Cal.App.3d 1604, 1615 [Sept.1991].)
In sum, the land use approval process requires the delicate balancing of a number of issues
and criteria. The Planning and Zoning Act, the California Endangered Species Act, and the
California Clean Air Act each have their own set of issues which locally elected officials
must evaluate. It is the environmental review process under CEQA which provides the
umbrella under which all of the health, safety and environmental criteria must be assessed.
In stark contrast to the myriad of environmental protections provided by the legislature over
the past twenty years, the Permit Streamlining Act appears to override all of the other
concerns by erecting a litmus test for review of development projects and a troubling
corallary: "If the review takes more than one-year, the project must be deemed approved;
If the environmental analysis takes more than one-year, you may not use it."
It is time to reconsider the Permit Streamlining Act.
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Both Government Code
Resources Code section 21
a 365-day period from the
at which an application is accepted as complete
take specified governmental actions. Under CEQA, a lead agency must
Environmental Impact Report within its one year rule. Certification establishes that
EIR "has been completed in compliance with CEQA" and that the lead agency has
the information within the EIR prior to approving the project. (Cal. Code of Regs.
15090.) Under PSA, a lead agency must approve or deny a project within one year. Since
both of these timelines begin running at the same time, it is possible that the one year rule
will run before the lead agency has the opportunity to hold hearings on the project, to
deliberate its merits and to make a fully informed decision. While the CEQA process may
be complete, no time will be left for project review by the decision makers. If the elected
decision makers are not ready to act on the day of certification, the project is "deemed
approved". That is, the applicant's proposal is approved by act of law, with no conditions,
mitigations, or other limitations to protect the public health and safety, including the
environment.
The PSA Allows the Applicant to Control the Process
Over time and in response to judicial disapproval of the sometimes draconian results of the
one year rule, various attempts at extending the time lines have been adopted. Under the
PSA, a single 90-day extension of the time to approve or deny may be granted =--~
applicant consents. While a voluntary written extension may be granted by an applicant.
It also happens that agency-applicant discussions of conditions and process continue,
implicitly indicating a waiver of the one-year rule, until 365 days pass and the applicant's
attorney demands permit issuance. This abuse of the Permit Streamlining Act is involved
in recent litigation against the City of Sausalito.
an EIR, if the
CEQA also allows "reasonable extensions" of
one-year rule for
applicant consents. While flexibility in
the CEQA limitations is important both
in reviewing the complicated projects which warrant an EIR and in assuring that CEQA's
substantive environmental provisions are carried out, existing law inadequately serves lead
agencies. First, an applicant can force a local agency to speed through the CEQA process
in order to meet the arbitrary one-year rule by withholding consent for an extension.
Second, many interpret the PSA and CEQA rules to mean that CEQA's "reasonable
extensions" are limited to one ninety day extension to certify and one ninety day PSA
extension to act. Applicant attorneys often read the 90-day extension in the Government
Code as a limitation on the more open ended CEQA extension language. In either instance,
it is the applicant which controls the process.
The applicant's control is not illusory.

It is common with controversial projects for

2

environmental groups and other project opponents to begin threatening CEQA suits ahead
of the time that the EIR is even prepared. Local officials then find themselves wedged
between a developer threatening to invoke CEQA's one-year rule to force a premature EIR
and NIMBY groups threatening to litigate even the slightest analytical defect. If the CEQA
analysis is faulty, the public will pursue costly litigation. If the agency requires more than
a year to complete the analysis, the applicant can assert the PSA's deemed approved
provisions and litigate to force issuance of the permits. Other witnesses have testified that
the City of Los Angeles was involved recently in this double bind.
CEOA Intends to Limit Approvals to Projects Where
Environmental Consequences are Known and
Alternatives or Mitigation Imposed
The policies of CEQA are clear.
"The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of the state that public
agencies should not approve projects as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or
feasible mitigation measures available which would substantially lessen the significant
environmental effects of such projects ....
* * *
The Legislature further finds and declares that in the event specific economic, social,
or other conditions make infeasible such project alternatives or such mitigation
measures, individual projects may be approved in spite of one or more significant
effects thereof." [Public Resources Code, section 21002.]

CEQA contains strong procedural and substantive mechanisms to effectuate these policies.
Among them are a requirement to prepare environmental analysis, elicit and respond to
public comment, formulate alternatives and conditions which would lessen the
environmental effects to acceptable levels, and produce findings and an administrative
record subject to judicial challenge.
In essence, CEQA requires a careful review and balancing of environmental and other
criteria related to a proposed development. In contrast, the Permit Streamlining Act ignores
all of the environmental, health and safety concerns in CEQA Instead, the only relevant
issue becomes has the lead agency approved or denied the application within 365 days of
its submittal. As today's testimony shows the conflicts between CEQA and the PSA
continue to exist and have arisen recently in the cities of Los Angeles, Sausalito and San
Diego.
Existing Time Limits Can Be Unworkable
The risk faced by local government officials in attempting to fully analyze the consequences
of complicated development projects is that analysis may take longer than the arbitrary 3653

day period.
timeline. (Please see
thirty-day period
period for ..,...,•• ...,~, •.u,,"""
period for responding to comments
period for the
pursuant to lead agency
EIR by all of the affected
transportation, parks and recreation,
to be addressed within
from
The remaining
days are available to
and
a request for
to interview and select a consultant, and to negotiate a contract and secure the applicant's
is some time to
commitment to reimburse the lead agency.
hopefully not
have the consultant begin preparing the
studies which may be necessary to
perform the CEQA analysis (e.g.,
modeling, noise assessment, biological inventories
for endangered species, etc.), to perform the necessary environmental impact analysis, and
to prepare the administrative draft EIR.
scheduling project
not
for much flexibility
The existing 365 day limitation
approvals or for much time for decision
the
information.
under the best circumstances, there is not much room before the "deemed
With threats of
hammer for elected officials to weigh the costs and benefits of a
litigation from both applicants
NIMBYs,
to balance all of
competing interests
an impossible

The PSA's
environmental
approved", the ability to condition a
ultra vires. The applicants'
at
environment is
a project, a court's

this
Either the legislature must adopt a
There are only two ways to
brightline rule that no project can
deemed
without the completion of '"''-'''-J£1
and a reasonable period of time within which to approve or deny the project once the
environmental consequences of the project are
or the deemed approved rule must
be modified to toll the approval and to include all of the mitigations recommended in the
CEQA analysis.
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Thank you for the opportunity to share the views of the League of California Cities with the
Local Government Committee.

Ernest Silva
Legislative Representative
H:\LEG\ES\CEQA.PSA
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December 17, 1991

Senate Local Government Committee
Marian Bergeson, Chairwoman
Room 2085, State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 94248
Re: AB 2223 and Problems with the Permit
Streamlining Act Generally
Dear Senator Bergeson:
AB 2223 is an important bill that would significantly improve
the Permit Streamlining Act ("PSA") (Gov. Code,§ 65920 et seq.) by
ensuring that
prior

to

"development projects"

completion of

negative

are not

"deemed approved"

declarations

or

environmental

impact reports ("EIRs") required by the California Environmental
Quality Act ("CEQA") (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.).
its current form,

PSA has been understood,

In

at least by Superior

Courts throughout the State, to allow development projects to be
deemed approved before anyone fully understands their environmental
consequences,
reasonable,
below,

and

before

the

formulation

feasible mitigation measures.

"automatic

approval"

in

such

and

imposition

of

As will be discussed

situations

can

have

dire

environmental consequences.
For example, the Marin County Superior Court ordered the City
of Sausalito to issue permits for a project in precisely in the
form

proposed

by

the

applicants,

even

though

the

California

Department of Transportation ("Caltrans"), in EIR comments, warned

1

that the project,

hillside north of the

to be located on a

Golden Gate, could increase the likelihood of a landslide onto U.S.
Highway 101, with possible loss of life.
reduce the chances that sirnil
the future,

Because AB 2223 should

absurd situations will occur in

the bill should be approved and sent to the Senate

1

Floor.

Although the legislation at hand will improve PSA, the Senate
Local Government Committee should have no illusion that the Act
will not need subsequent amendments to address different problems.
The difficulty of reconciling PSA with CEQA requirements is by no
means the only problem with the Act.

PSA also conflicts with a

number of aspects of the Planning and Zoning Law (Gov.
65000 et seq.) and the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code,
seq. ) .

More fundamental,

however,

§

Code,

§

66410 et

is the conflict between the

concept of automatic approval and the federal and state
due process rights of landowners affected by such
unclear whether this

conflict can be

s.

resolved at

all.

It is
If

it

cannot, the statute (and the concept of automatic approval) must
give

way

to

the

federal

and

state

constitutions.

Thus,

the

Legislature should begin to consider substituting another approach
for

ensuring

or

at

least

quick

agency

action

on

proposed development projects.

This endorsement does not suggest, however, that the language
of the bill could not use some minor tinkering.
In particular,
proposed Section 2 of the bill is ambiguous and unclear, and should
be tightened before the bill becomes law.
2

BASIC PROVISIONS OF PSA
PSA was
considered

enacted in order to prevent what

to

have

been

unacceptable

applications for "development projects."

the

Legislature

in

processing

delays

(See Gov. Code,

§

65928. )

2

Under the statute, public agencies' failure to either approve or
deny

such

projects

within

specified

timelines

will

projects to be deemed approved by operation of law,
certain qualifications discussed below. (Gov. Code,
PSA

time

requirements

apply

to

development projects filed with cities,
local

and

Commission
facilities.

state
in

public
its

agencies,

function

of

all

siting

The act does not apply,

the

though,

65950.)
for

and all other

California

certain

the

subject to

applications

counties,

except

§

cause

power

Energy
plant

to "administrative

2

/
"Development" is defined in Government Code section 65927 to
include the following, both on land or in or under water: the
placement or erection of any solid material or structure; discharge
or disposal of any dredged material or of any gaseous, liquid,
solid, or thermal waste; grading, removing, dredging, mining, or
extraction of any materials; change in the density or intensity of
use of land, including subdivisions and other land divisions except
when done in connection with a public agency's purchase of land for
recreational use; change in the intensity of use of water, or of
access thereto;
construction,
reconstruction,
demolition,
or
alteration of the size of any structure, including any facility of
any private, public, or municipal utility; and the removal or
harvesting of major vegetation other than for agricultural
purposes, kelp harvesting, and timber operations pursuant to a
timber harvesting plan.
''Structures" are defined to include "any
building, road, pipe, flume, conduit, siphon, aqueduct, telephone
line, and electrical power transmission and distribution line."
(Gov. Code, § 65927.)

In applying the concept of "development," at least one Court
of Appeal decision declined to extend it to a situation that did
not seem to be "development" in the common meaning of the word.
(Meridian Ocean Systems, Inc. v. California State Lands Commission
(1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 153, 167 [271 Cal.Rptr. 445] (PSA did not
apply to permits for underwater geophysical testing designed to
ascertain the character of ocean floor).)
3

appeals within a state or local agency or to a state or local
(Gov. Code,

agency."
and

Savi

Bank

~~~~----~'-~--------

65922;

§

(1991)

233

Cal.App.3d

1612-1618

1

[ 285

Cal.Rptr. 699].)
Significantly, the term "development project," as used in PSA,
does not apply to proposed agency actions that are legislative or
quasi-legislative in character, such as requests for general plan
Nor does the term embrace agency

amendments and zoning changes.
actions

that

are

ministerial

in

Rather,

nature.

the

statute

applies only to requests for quasi-adjudicatory actions such as
approvals
variances.
respond

to

of

tentative
Agencies

proposals

subdivision

therefore
for

are

maps,
under

legislative

use
no

permits,

time

actions,

and

pressure

even

when

to

such

requests are presented within multi-part applications that also
include requests for quasi-adjudicatory actions.
65928; Landi v.

( Gov.

Code ,

§

(1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 934 [189

Lands Commission

(1990)

222 Cal.App.3d 153,

445]; and Land Waste

167

[271 Cal.Rptr.

. Contra Costa

( 1990) 222

Cal.App.3d 950 [271 Cal.Rptr. 900].)
Government
provides that,

Code

section

65950

is

the

heart

of

PSA.

It

for any development project for which an EIR is

required, agency action must be taken either approving or denying
the project within a year after the application has been "received
and accepted as complete."

Government Code section 65957 allows a

single 90-day extension with the applicant's consent.

These two

sections, however, must be read in conjunction with Government Code
4
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section 65956, as well as Public Resources Code sections 21100.2
and 21151.5 (from CEQA), all of which are discussed below.
Section 65950 also provides that,

for projects for which a

negative declaration will suffice, or which are exempt from CEQA
agency action must occur within six months,

review altogether,

"unless the project proponent requests an extension of the time
limit."

The statute does not expressly limit how long such an

extension can be.

In many situations, the opportunity to request

such an extension may benefit an applicant, who may be faced with
the

dilemma

of

either

going

past

the

ostensible

deadline

for

approving a negative declaration or accepting the need to prepare
a full EIR.

Again, though, this aspect of section 65950 must be

read in conjunction with Government Code section 65956 and Public
Resources Code sections 21100.2 and 21151.5.

PSA/CEQA INTERFACE
The interface between PSA and CEQA is extremely complex; and
in applying the two statutory schemes together, interested parties
are confronted with ambiguities, seeming inconsistencies, and legal
and practical difficulties.

Unfortunately, these problems can only

be resolved either by legislative amendments or further litigation.
The two CEQA provisions referenced above (sections 21100.2 and
21151.5) apply to all projects "involving the issuance to a person
of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for
use by one or more public agencies."
includes

some

meaning of

that

PSA,

the

are

not

Because this list of projects

"development

two sections
5

projects"

from CEQA apply

within
to

a

the

larger

universe of activities than PSA does.

Still, all projects subject

to PSA are also subject to the two CEQA sections.
state and local

Sections 21100.2 and 21151.5

to establish time limits by which EIRs are completed and certified
within one year, and negative declarations are completed within 105
days.

The two statutes also allow for an unspecified "reasonable

extension

of

the

time

period

in

the

event

that

compel!

circumstances justify additional time and the project applicant
consents

thereto. "

Although

the

statutes

do

not

provide

any

express limitations on how long such extensions may be, Government
Code section 65950.1 requires that, where such extensions have been
granted, the lead agency must approve or deny the project within 90
days

after

the

EIR

has

been

certified.

That

90-day

period,

however, may be subject to a single additional 90-day extension;
Government

Code

section

65957

can

be

read

to

allow

such

an

extension, although the statute is not a model of clarity.
When one reads Public Resources Code sections 21100.2 and
21151.5 together with Government Code section 65950,

it becomes

clear that a lead agency cannot satisfy PSA simply by satisfying
the two CEQA sections.

Under section 65950,

a lead agency must

approve or deny a project within a year after an application is
accepted as complete, whereas under the two Public Resources Code
sections the obligation is only to certify an EIR within that same
time period.
approval.

Certification, of course, is not the same as project

(See CEQA Guidelines,

§

3

15090.)

3

Thus, when dealing

/
The CEQA Guidelines are found in Title 14 of the California
Code of Regulations, commencing with section 15000.

6

{l80
with a "development project," a lead agency must be sure not only
to certify a project's EIR within a year, but also to take action
approving or denying the project.
For projects

that

are either exempt

from

CEQA or can be

approved with a negative declaration, reading the various statutes
together

presents

Government

Code

even

section

more

difficulties.

65950

requires

As

that,

noted

for

above,

development

projects exempt from CEQA or subject only to negative declarations,
lead agencies must take action approving or denying the projects
within six months after the applications are accepted as complete,
unless

the

21100.2

applicants

and 21151.5,

seek extensions.
which do not

In contrast,

sections

apply to exempted projects,

merely require lead agencies to complete negative declarations
There is no requirement to actually approve

within 105 days.

projects within any time frame;

and extensions are only allowed

under "compelling circumstances," as described above.

Moreover, as

with the requirement to complete and certify an EIR within a year,
there is no penalty provided for failure to complete a negative
declaration within 105 days.
"directory"

rather

unenforceable.
State

Lands

than

The requirement, then, may only be
and

may

therefore

(See Meridian Ocean Systems,

Inc.

v. California

Commission

"mandatory,"

(1990)

222

Cal.App.3d

153,

168

be

[271

Cal. Rptr. 445] . )
If the statutes are read literally, moreover, an applicant for
a development project subject to a negative declaration may be
willing to waive the six-month time limit under section 65950 but
find an agency unwilling to grant an extension pursuant to section
7
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21100.2 and 21151.5, which require "compelling circumstances" to
justify variance from statutory time limits.
be

anomalous,

to

be

statutory language.

sure,

but

would

be

Such a result would
consistent

with

the

icant

For the contrary result to occur, an

would have to be able, essentially, to demand that an extension be
granted pursuant to the two CEQA sections.
It is not clear what happens if,
requiring

EIRs,

extensions

based on

for development projects
"compelling circumstances"

pursuant to sections 21100.2 and 21151.5 go beyond the deadlines of
six months, one year, and fifteen months (one year plus 90 days)
set by sections 65950 and 65957.

One view is that such extensions

operate wholly separate from those deadlines, and that, where there
really are
except

for

"compelling circumstances," no real deadlines apply,
the

need

certifying an EIR.

to

take

final

action

within

(See Gov. Code, section 65950.1.)

90

days

of

Another view

is that fifteen months represents the absolute deadline for final
action pursuant to PSA.
Things become even more complex when section 65950 is read in
conjunction with

section

65956,

which

provides

that

automatic

approval can occur "only if the public notice required by law has
occurred."
Appeal

This requirement was added in 1987 after the Court of

issued

Palmer

v.

( 1986)

178

Cal.

.3d

280

[223

Cal.Rptr. 542], which held that automatic approval could occur even
if property owners adjacent to the project sites in question had
been given no opportunity to voice their concerns at a public
hearing.

(As will be discussed below, the opposite conclusion was

8

reached in a more recent decision,

Selinger v. City Council (1989)

216 Cal.App.3d 259, 271-274 [264 Cal.Rptr. 499].)
As amended,

section 65956 creates two strategies by which

applicants can attempt to force agencies to hold public hearings.
Subdivision (a) provides that, for development projects for which
public hearings are required but for which none has been scheduled
as of 60 days prior to the expiration of the time periods of
section 65950, the applicant or his or her representative may file
a legal action compelling the lead agency to "provide the public
notice or hold the hearing, or both."

Applicants, then, can force

the agencies to give affected property owners the chance to be
heard.
The

practical

effects

of

subdivision

another option, are much less clear.

(b),

which provides

The subdivision states that

"the permit shall be deemed approved only if the public notice
required by law has occurred," but then describes a kind of "public
notice" that differs substantially from that which is contemplated
in subdivision (a).
pending

public

Rather than notify interested persons of a

hearing,

the

"public

notice"

described

in

subdivision (b) may be provided by the applicant, not the agency,
and may simply state that the project will be deemed approved if
the agency does not act within 60 days.

Before publishing such

notice, the applicant must provide seven days advance notice to the
agency,

apparently

unnecessary.

so

that

the

publication

Once the notice is published,

sixty days in which to act on the project.

may

prove

to

be

the agency then has
Such notice, then, is

apparently intended to give the agency one last chance to act, and
9

to inform interested and affected persons of the need to ensure
that the agency does so.
Bank (1991)

(Ciani

233 Cal.App.3d 1604,

Trust and S
1609,

1618-1620 [285 Cal.Rptr.

699] . )
Both

subdivisions

(a)

and

(b)

must

be

read

in

1

of

subdivision (c), which states that "[n]othing in this section shall
diminish the permitting agency's legal responsibility to provide,
where applicable,

public notice and hearing before acting on a

permit application."
What remains unclear is whether, if the agency fails to act
within 60 days after an applicant provides the

"public notice"

authorized by subdivision (b), the mere notice of pending automatic
approval has allayed the constitutional concerns raised in the
Sel~~er

below,

decision.

In that case, which is described in more detail

the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District rejected the

Second District's decision in Palmer, supra, and concluded that the
absence of a public hearing deprived property owners adjacent to
the

project

§~linger

area

of

their

constitutional

right

to

be

heard.

interpreted section 65956 before it was amended in 1987,

and thus did not directly address the question of whether those
amendments cured the identified constitutional problem.

It is

unclear whether the due process rights of those property owners can
be adequately protected simply by an applicant publishing a notice
stating that an agency had better take action soon or face the
consequences.

Although the Court stated,

in dicta,

that "[t]he

recent amendments to the Permit Streamlining Act . . . resolve the
constitutional issue for all current applications," the Court may
10

have

mistakenly

notice

and

a

interpreted subdivision

public

rather

hearing,

(b)

than

automatic approval could occur within 60 days.

as

requiring

simply

both

notice

that

(216 Cal.App.3d at

265, fn. 3, 274, fn. 8 [264 Cal.Rptr. 499].)

CASE LAW INTERPRETING PSA
Two

recent

published Court

of

Appeal

opinions

issues arising under PSA merit extended discussion.

addressing

In

Selin~er,

supra, a developer filed an action against a city seeking a court
order declaring that his tentative tract map for a 260-acre parcel
was approved by operation of law.

The city had failed to take

action on the developer's project

(for which an EIR was to be

prepared) within a year of the date on which the application had
been accepted as complete.

Interpreting Government Code section

65956 before it was amended in 1987, the Court of Appeal denied the
requested relief, holding that, in the absence of a public hearing
on

the

proposed

project,

automatic

approval

would

unconstitutionally deprive adjacent landowners of their right to be
heard on the city's quasi-adjudicatory decision.
When this case arose, as noted above, section 65956 included
no provision requiring that any kind of public hearing be held, or
that

"public

occurred.

notice"

be

provided,

before

automatic

approval

In Palmer, supra, which interpreted the former statute,

the Court of Appeal for the Second District had held that such as
scheme was constitutional.
in

effect,

that

a

local

In so concluding, the Court reasoned,
agency

11

should not

profit

by

its

own

failures,

regardless

of the harsh effect on adjacent

property

owners.
In Se:I:inger,

however,

for

the Court of

the

Fourth

District reached the opposite conclusion, relying primarily on Horn
v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605 [156 Cal.Rptr. 718], in
which

the

California

Supreme

subdivision map could not

be

Court

held

that

a

tentative

approved automatically under the

Subdivision Map Act without a public hearing, because such a result
deprived adjacent property owners of their constitutional right to
be heard.

Applying the logic of Horn to the facts of its own case,

the Fourth District concluded that such persons'

constitutional

rights were similarly violated when automatic approval occurred
under PSA in the absence of a public hearing.
section

65956,

being

only

a

had

statute,

In other words,
to

give

way

to

constitutional due process requirements. (216 Cal.App.3d at 272-274

[264 Cal.Rptr. 499].)
On

its

face,

the

Court's

conclusion

primarily of academic interest because,

may

now

seem

to

be

despite the holding in

Palmer in 1986, the Legislature in 1987 amended section 65956.

As

noted above, however, it remains unclear whether those amendments
remedy the constitutional problem identified by the Selinger court.
In stating in a footnote, in dicta, that the amendments had solved
the problem, the Court referred to its own interpretation of the
amendments,

which

apparently

read

subdivision

(b)

to

require

applicants to provide both notice and a public hearing, not merely
notice

that

the

project

could

be

12

automatically

approved

even

without a hearing.

(216 Ca1.App.3d at 265, fn. 3, 274, fn. 8 [264

Cal. Rptr. 499] . )
Probably the most important PSA case issued to date, and the
only extant published case directly addressing the 1987 amendments,
is Ciani v. San Diego Trust and Savings Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d
1604

[ 285

Cal. Rptr.

699] .

4

Most

significantly,

the

opinion

suggests that automatic approvals under the Act remain subject to
whatever administrative appellate procedures would normally apply
to projects directly approved or denied by an agency decisionmaking
body.
Ciani involved a coastal development permit granted by the
City

of

San

Commission's
coastal

Diego

("City")

"delegated

permits

Resources Code,

under
§

acting

local
the

30600.5.)

as

agency"

California

the
for

California

Coastal

administering

Coastal

Act.

(See

local
Pub.

Under Public Resources Code section

30603 (of the Coastal Act), the City's decisions on such permits
were normally appealable to the Commission.

In holding that even

automatic approvals remained subject to such appeals,

the Court

cited the interests of "third party contestants" in language that
would seem to apply in other contexts, such as local proceedings in
which planning commission approvals or denials are appealable to a
city council or board of supervisors.

(233 Cal.App.3d at 1615 [285

Cal. Rptr. 699] . )

4

/
The losing party in Ciani filed a petition for review with the
California Supreme Court.
The petition was denied.
The State's
highest court therefore is aware of the holding in Ciani, and
declined either to reverse it or "depublish" the opinion.
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In Ciani, the Court of Appeal held that two permits issued by
the City were invalid due to noncompliance with PSA and certain
Coastal Act provisions.

The coastal development permit, as well as

a demolition permit issued by the City pursuant to its municipal
code,

would

have

allowed

the

destruction

of

four

historic

properties within an area of La Jolla known as the "Green Dragon
Colony."

The City had granted the two permits in settlement of a

PSA lawsuit filed by the applicant (a trust), which complained that
the

City had taken no

action

applications were filed.
plaintiff

urged

that

for more

than

a

year

after the

The Coastal Commission and an individual

demolition

should

not

proceed

Commission reviewed the coastal development permit.

until

the

The property

owner had commenced demolition on the same day the City issued the
permit. (233 Cal.App.3d at 1610 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].)
Prior to filing its suit, the landowner had sent a letter to
the City's

planning director

in accordance with

the

seven-

notice provision of Government Code section 65956, subdivision (b).
Such notice warned the City that the trust intended to invoke what
it perceived to be its rights under PSA.

Seven days later, the

trust caused a public notice to be sent to neighboring landowners
and interested parties, specifying that, unless the City acted on
the coastal development permit within 60 days, the permit would be
"deemed approved."
Commission.

(233

No copy of the notice, however, was sent to the
Cal.App.3d

at

1609-1610,

1617,

1620

[285

Cal.Rptr. 699].)
After waiting more than 60 days without action by the City,
the trust filed the lawsuit that resulted in the issuance of the
14

()tj7
coastal development permit and demolition permit.

Only on the day

of issuance was the Commission notified of either the danger or
reality

of

automatic

Cal.Rptr. 699].)

approval.

(233

Cal.App.3d

at

1617

(285

Before the Court of Appeal, the Commission argued

that the coastal development permit could not have become effective
for at least ten days after the City issued it, since such a period
was allowed for appeal pursuant to Public Resources Code section
30603.

The trust argued that no right of appeal existed at all for

automatic approvals; as a fallback, though, it urged that, if such
a right did exist, the 10-day appeal period would have begun to run
with the expiration of the 60-day period commenced when it filed
notice pursuant to Government Code section 65956, subdivision (b).
(Such

a

period would have

lawsuit. )

expired before

the

trust

filed

its

The Commission argued that the 10-day appeal period

could commence only when an applicant successfully compels issuance
of a permit (i.e., through litigation).

(233 Cal.App.3d at 1614-

1616 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].)
The Court agreed with the Commission that a right to appeal
exists,

but agreed with the trust that the 10-day period should

start on the date of automatic approval--without the need for legal
action to compel issuance of the permit.

Still, though, no appeal

period can commence until the appellate body is notified of the
automatic

approval,

as

expressly

required

by

the

Commission's

regulations for permits approved by delegated local agencies.
this case, the trust never provided any such notice.

In

Thus, because

the Commission first learned of the automatic approval on July 10,

15

1991,

the

appeal

period

continued

through

July

20th.

(233

Cal.App.3d at 1616-1618 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].)
of PSA

In holding that even permits approved
remained subject to appeal to the Commission, the Court

zed

the rights of affected third parties, implicitly echoing the due
process concerns addressed in

Sel~~ger:

"Where the permit is obtained by the 'deemed approved'
mechanism of the Streamlining Act, the parties in
opposition are effectively prevented from presenting a
case. If a provision for appeal is appropriate following
the hearing and appearance procedures which attend the
typical method of permit grant, it would seem even more
necessary when considered in light of a 'deemed approved'
permit. If appellate rights were considered extinguished
as the result of the City's inaction, the City could by
such inaction deprive third party contestants of all
opportunity to object at a public hearing.
We cannot
believe this to have been the intent of the Streamlining
Act."
(233 Cal.App.3d at 1615 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].)
The Court of Appeal next addressed the question of whether the
trust, in issuing its public notice of imminent automatic approval
absent action by the City, had adequately complied with the terms
of Government Code section 65956,
reasoned that,

subdivision

(b).

The Court

although the content of the notice issued by the

trust was adequate, the trust should have distributed the notice to
the Commission.

The statute expressly requires that an applicant

issuing the notice comply with the "distribution requirements under
applicable provisions of law."
to

require

notice

to

The Court interpreted this phrase

whatever

persons

and

entities

might

be

entitled to notice of potential agency action on the permits in
question.

For the demolition permit,

were

in the San Diego Municipal

found

16

the applicable provisions
Code.

For the coastal

development permit, the Commission regulations governed.

Although,

according to the Court, the trust "appears to have complied with
many of the requirements of the Municipal Code," it did not comply
with the Commission regulations.

Specifically,

itself did not receive the notice.

the Commission

Since the Commission never

received the 60-day notice, the trust never provided the "public
notice required by law, " which is a prerequisite for automatic
approval under PSA.
never

"deemed

The coastal development permit,

approved."

(233

Cal.App.3d

at

then,

1618-1620

was
[285

Cal. Rptr. 699] . )
In this last part of the opinion, the Court seemed to assume
that

the

phrase

"public notice

required by

law,"

Government Code section 65956, subdivision (b),

as

found

in

referred only to

the kind of notice that an applicant can issue in order to try to
force agency action within 60 days.
1619 [285 Cal.Rptr. 699].)

(233 Cal.App.3d at 1609, 1618-

The parties apparently did not question

this assumption, since there had been no City proceedings on the
coastal development permit prior to which any kind of notice would
have been given.

REMAINING PROBLEMS WITH PSA

The

problem

with

PSA

most

relevant

to

AB

2223

is

the

possibility of automatic approval before agencies complete their
environmental documents and without agencies being able to impose
reasonable,

feasible mitigation measures.

A concrete example of

the dire consequences of such occurrences is evident from the facts
of a case entitled,

Patterson v. City of Sausalito (1 Civil No.
17

A053074), currently on appeal before the Court of Appeal for the
First District in San Francisco.

The project in question would

involve the construction of residential units on a steep hillside
uphill

from U.S.

Highway 101,

at

the

edge of the Golden Gate

National Recreation Area.
In that
project was

case,

the Superior Court held that

"deemed approved"

a developer's

in precisely the form originally

proposed by the applicant, despite the fact that a completed EIR
showed

that

it

would

cause

numerous

significant

environmental

effects, including the following:
(1)

the very real possibility of a landslide on United States
Highway 101, which, according to Caltrans, could lead to
loss of life it if occurs during peak commute hours;

(2)

loss of habitat of a federally-listed endangered species
(the Mission Blue Butterfly);

( 3)

potentially insoluble sewage disposal problems, since the
project area is not served by sewers and is not well
suited for conventional septic systems;

(4)

potential for hillside erosion from storm water runoff;

(5)

the risk of fire danger for new residents due to the lack
of adequate water for fire protection services; and

(6)

visual impacts within the GGNRA.

Without exception, these impacts could have been diminished or
avoided if the Superior Court had allowed the City of Sausalito to
impose mitigation measures.

The trial court reasoned, though, that

the project "deemed approved" was the precise project initially
sought by the applicant.

It is not hard to imagine other scenarios

with even more absurd results.
From a policy standpoint, the major question here is whether
the environment and innocent third persons should be made to pay
18

the price for an agency's slowness in processing an application.
In the Sausalito example, the environmental impacts could even lead
to the death of innocent commuters.
Another major problem with PSA is what to do when applicants
and agency staff disagree as to whether proposed projects are
consistent or inconsistent with applicable general plans or zoning
and subdivision requirements.

Sometimes reasonable minds differ as

to whether projects require legislative actions (e.g., amendments
to such plans, zoning ordinances, or subdivision ordinances); and
applicants give themselves the benefit of the doubt by assuming
that their proposals are consistent.

Staff may disagree;

but

unless and until agency decisionmakers have the chance to resolve
this conflict, the debate remains unresolved.

Where projects are

approved automatically prior to such resolution, they can include
features inconsistent with governing local ordinances.
The next major problem with PSA is the question of whether
even the 1987 amendments, made in response to Palmer, adequately
protect the procedural due process rights of affected landowners.
They may not; and the Legislature's eventual response may have to
be to abandon the whole concept of automatic approval in favor of
some other mechanism for quickening the approval process.
To

understand

the

nature

of

the

constitutional

issues

involved, a survey of relevant case law is a helpful way to begin.
The most important general statements of federal "procedural
due process" principles in the context of land use decisionmaking
occur in Hqrn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 615-619
[156 Cal.Rptr. 718], which was briefly described above.
19

In that

seminal

decision,

which

dealt

with

Subdivision

Map

Act

requirements, the California Supreme Court held that the minimal
notice

requirements of CEQA

constitutional

rights

of

5

did not

property

the
owners

who

would

be

"substantially affected" by the approval of a proposed tentative
subdivision map.

6

As a result, the Court set aside the respondent

agency's approval of the map, and ordered that improved notice be
given.
In so holding, the Court emphasized that affected landowners
should have been given the opportunity to be heard at a "meaningful
hearing" prior to agency action on the project.

[156 Cal.Rptr. 718] (emphasis added).)

(24 Cal.3d at 618

In support of the principle

that a "predeprivation hearing" be "meaningful," the Court cited
two landmark procedural due process cases: Beaudreau v. Superior
Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458 [121 Cal.Rptr. 585]; and Bell v.
Burson (1981) 402 U.S. 535, 541 [91 S.Ct. 1586].)

5

Although neither

In Horn, the defendant county's CEQA notice procedures required
only the posting of notices in various locations and the mailing of
notice to persons who had specifically requested such notice. From
a constitutional standpoint, such notice was not "reasonably
calculated to afford affected persons the realistic opportunity to
protect their interests," although it may have been adequate "to
encourage the generalized public participation in the environmental
decision making contemplated by CEQA." (24 Cal.3d at 617-618 [156
Cal.Rptr. 718].)
/

6

I
In Horn, the plaintiff adjacent landowner urged that his
property would be "substantially affected" by the proposed
subdivision because it would "substantially interfere with his use
of the only access from his parcel to the public streets, and
[would] increase both traffic congestion and air pollution." The
Court held that, "[f]rom a pleading standpoint, plaintiff has thus
adequately described a deprivation sufficiently 'substantial' to
require procedural due process protection." (24 Cal.3d at 615 [156
Cal.Rptr. 718].)
20

0~}3

case

involved

land

use

decisionmaking,

both

cases

articulate

standards that necessarily apply in that context.
In Beaudreau, the California Supreme Court quoted the United
States

Supreme

Court's

statement

in

Bell

that

"' [i]t

is

a

proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing
which

excludes

decision .

consideration

of

an

element

. does not meet this standard.'"

[121 Cal.Rptr. 585]

(emphasis added).)

essential

to

the

(14 Cal.3d at 458

In another federal case,

Armstrong v. Manzo (1965) 380 U.S. 545, 552 [85 S.Ct. 1187], the
Supreme Court emphasized that the "opportunity to be heard" must be
granted "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."

7

7

I
In Beaudreau, the Court held that procedural due process
principles were
ated by former Government Code sections 947 and
951, which allowed defendant public agencies to require plaintiffs
to post undertakings as security against court costs that might
ultimately be awarded to the agencies. The Court explained that "a
due process hearing would necessarily inquire into the merit of the
plaintiff's action as well as into the reasonableness of the amount
of the undertaking in light of the defendant's probable expenses."
(14 Cal.3d at 460-462 (121 Cal.Rptr. 585].)

In Bel~, the U.S. Supreme Court had addressed a similar issue.
The Court struck down as unconstitutional a Georgia statute
requiring the suspension of the driver's licenses of uninsured
motorists involved in accidents unless such motorists posted
undertakings during litigation filed against them. The statute was
defective because it did not require a hearing on the possibility
that the motorists would be held liable prior to depriving them of
their licenses or requiring the undertakings. (402 U.S. at 540 [91
s.ct. 1586].)
In Armstrong, the Court held that Texas had violated the due
process rights of the natural father of a child whom the husband of
his ex-wife wanted to adopt. Under the state court procedures, the
natural father had been provided no notice of the pre-adoption
hearing; and this defect was not cured by his ability to obtain a
post-adoption hearing at which he had the burden to prove the
incorrectness of the original decision.
(380 U.S. at 551-552 [85
S. Ct. 118 7] . )
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In 1986, as noted above, the Second Appellate District issued
, which concluded that,

its problematic holding in Palmer v

despite the reasoning of Horn, section 65956 as originally drafted
was not unconstitutional even though projects could

"

approved" in the absence of any public hearing at which affected
property owners could voice their concerns.
In

1989,

District,

in Selinger v.

interpreting

the

the

City Council,

same

(now

outdated)

code

Fourth

section,

reached the opposite conclusion, finding the reasoning of Palmer to
be absolutely irreconcilable with that of Horn:
"The Palmer court concluded, 'In the matter before us, City's
failure to follow Horn may not be used by City to invalidate
legislative enactments in any way inconsistent with the
procedural due process considerations involved in Horn.' (Id.,
at p. 292, original italics.)
"The Palmer court relied heavily on its perception that
the failure to provide notice was the fault of the local
government. The Palmer court apparently overlooked the Horn
court's discussion of the automatic approval provisions which
appear in the Subdivision Map Act:
'[T]he due process
requirements discussed herein are not rooted in statute but
are compelled by the stronger force of constitutional
principle.' (Horn, supra 24 Cal.3d at p. 616.)
"As in Horn, automatic approval of Sel
's tentative
tract map could lead to substantial deprivation of property of
neighboring landowners. The California Supreme Court held in
Horn
that
approval of tentative subdivision maps is
unconstitutional unless adequate notice and a hearing are
provided.
We see no way to reconcile Palmer with the Horn
decision.
We are duty bound to follow Horn; thus, we
concluded
that
the
Permit
Streamlining
Act
was
unconstitutional insofar as it led to approval of applications
for development without provision for notice and a hearing to
affected landowners."
(216 Cal.App.3d at 274 [264 Cal.Rptr. 259]
footnoted omitted.)
Interestingly,
65956,

the

(emphasis added;

in addressing the 1987 amendments to section

Selinger court

stated,
22

in

dicta,

that

"the

recent

amendments

to

the

Permit

Streamlining

resolve

Act

the

constitutional issue for all current applications for development."
(216

Cal.App.3d

statement,
65956

to

at

though,
include

hearing."

(216

274,

fn.

[264

Cal.Rptr.

This

259].)

assumes that "the Legislature amended section
a

requirement of notice to the public and a

Cal.App.3d at

(emphasis added). )

8

Thus,

265,

fn.

3

[264

Cal.Rptr.

259]

to the extent that the term "public

notice required by law" in section 65956, subdivision (b), can be
understood to require only notice,

but not

a hearing,

such an

interpretation would be unconstitutional according to Selinger.

8

In light of the reasoning in Horn and Selinger, the question
of the whether an agency has issued the "public notice required by
law" is inseparable from the question of whether the hearing for
which the notice was given actually provided affected property
owners'

a

"meaningful" opportunity "to be heard. "

If no such

linkage is made, then an interpretation of PSA by which "automatic
approval" could occur as long as mere notice by an agency, without
a

meaningful

hearing,

unconstitutional.

has

been

given,

would

clearly

be

In other words, simple "notice" by itself cannot

protect the procedural due process rights of affected landowners,

8

/
Unless it was just a misreading of the words of the statute,
the Seling~~ court's reading of the 1987 amendments undoubtedly
reflects the principle that "remedial" amendments (i.e., those
attempting to cure a perceived defect in the original statute),
"must be liberally construed so as to effectuate [their] object and
purpose, and to suppress the mischief at which [they were]
directed. "
(California State Restaurant Association v. Whitlow
(1976) 58 Ca1.App.3d 340, 347 [129 Cal.Rptr. 824]; see also Cit~
SanJose v. Forsythe (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 114, 117 [67 Cal.Rptr.
754] and Lande v. Jurisich (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 613, 616-617 [139
P.2d 657].
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who have a right

to be heard. "

the decision" at hand.

(Armstrong,

S. Ct.

supra,

1187];

Beaudreau,

The notice must relate to a

14 Cal. 3d at 458

[ 121 Cal

585]; Bell, supra, 402 U.S. at 542 [91 s.ct. 1586]; see

also~~

supra, 24 Cal.3d at 618 [156 Cal.Rptr. 718].)
It is unclear whether a hearing held prior to completion of an
EIR or negative declaration can be constitutionally ''meaningful."
Arguably, such a hearing does not occur at a "meaningful time," and
cannot address all
decision."

In

"element[s] essential to the

situations

in

which

automatic

[lead agency's]
approval

is

a

realistic possibility, affected landowners should be made aware of
that very danger so that they "can be heard" on the question of how
such a draconian result can be avoided.
hearing held

after

this

In the absence of a public

possibility

becomes

public

knowledge,

automatic approval based on "public notice required by law" issued
for previous hearings is constitutional
In other words,

problematic.

short of a hearing on the merits of

a project may not be constitutionally meaningful.

An affected

landowner's "right to be heard" may be meaningless unless he or she
is addressing decisionmakers who
said.

9

the power to act on what is

That power, of course, must include the power to deny a

project--even if more than six months or a year has passed since

9

/
By analogy, a defendant who can only argue his case after he
has been convicted of a crime has
been accorded due process.
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Under this analysis,

PSA timelines can do little more than

testimony and,

to hear

if

or condition the

they desire,

Any kind of automatic approval

project.

must be able

at which the

force agencies to hold

affected landowners being given a

fair

which occurs

chance to

interests, may be unconstitutional.
In

light

of

these

considerations,

the

Legislature

should

abandon the concept of automatic approval in favor of an approach
by

which

agencies

conditioning,
Such

a

are

forced

to

act

on

projects--approving,

or denying them--within a reasonable time period.

reform

would

end

the

gamesmanship

that

often

occurs

currently, by which applicants often cooperate with agencies while
deadlines pass (even contributing to such delay themselves), then
lie in wait to demand automatic approval if local politics begin to
shift against them, or if agency decisionmakers indicate a desire
to impose mitigation measures the applicants do not like.
A reformed PSA without automatic approval would still serve
the primary goal of the original statute: forcing agencies to reach

decisions on projects within a reasonable time frame.

The existing

statute already serves this function to a degree.

By providing

notice of potential automatic approval pursuant to Government Code
section 65956, subdivision (b), an applicant can force an agency to
take final action within 60 days, as the Ciani decision held.
Under

such

proposed

reforms,

a

lead

agency

would

still

maintain ultimate control over the form of a project, which could
be

approved,

conditioned,

or

denied.

What

interests have argued for (effectively so far,
25

many

development

at least in the

of that control, whereby, as

Superior Courts) is the
punishment for an

an applicant is rewarded

above,

demonstrates
upheld
unlikely),

the
the

in the

the form
of

recent

absurd consequences of

the

ication.

Ci

a

would require

pol

surrender their police power,

of

As

Sausalito

such an approach.

the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court
such

ication,

her ultimate wish:

being

the project in preci
noted

an

slowness in

If

which appears
to

complete

ess of the consequences, as a

penalty for not moving quickly enough.

The Legislature could save

years of litigation by solving these problems legislatively in the
near future.
CONCLUSION
the Court quoted a commentator who
observed" that"' [l]aid almost

upon a heap of existing

rules, the changes [of the Permit Streaml

Act] set up a chain

reaction of statutory conflicts that continues

fn.

(Wilson,

(Aug. 1987) Cal.Law. 67, 68.)" (216

Down Stream from Streaml

Cal.App.3d at 267,

"

5 [2

Cal.Rptr. 499].)

The commentator

should have added reference to "constitutional conflicts" as well.
The Legislature should begin rethinking its whole approach to
forcing agency action on deve

ects.

AB 2223 would be a

big improvement to PSA, in that the bill should he

to reduce the

frequency of horror stories such as the one from the Sausalito
litigation described above.

The bill, though, would do nothing to

address the existing statute's constitutional problems.
to grips with that more fundamental problem,
26

In coming

Legislature has

two choices:

either to let the courts continue to interpret the

Act, and then see what's left; or to go back to the
to come up with a way to balance the

board
's

for quick action on projects with the myriad other considerations
touched on above.
Sincerely,

L,

James G. Moose

1120301.003
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COASTAL AREA SUPPORT TEAM

1 0 December 1 991

Senate Committee on Local Government
P.O. Box 94246
Sacramento, California 94248-0001
RE: AB 2223 PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT
Honorable Ms. Marian Bergeson and Committeemembers:
COAST members and directors are concerned about the
disharmony between the Permit Streamling Act and the
California Environmental Quality Act.
We are a non-profit corporation comprised of activists and
representatives of community associations from Santa Monica
to Weschester along Lincoln Boulevard.
We have witnessed
the divisive effect of these conflicting statutes with the
proposed Blanchard project.
On one hand, COAST recognizes the concerns of developers who
risk time and money when entering into a building project.
There are many uncertainties.
Whert a municipality fails in
its responsibility to act in a timely manner in approving a
project, it adds an unwarranted burden.
PSA gives
developers some protection against this.
On the other hand, COAST sees that the public must be
informed and protected from the harmful effects of proposed
developments.
CEQA ensures this protection.
COAST urges that these two statutes be harmonized.
Developers, municipalities, and the public are partners
working for positive community growth.
To work together, we
need to have one set of rules.
For those parties who would argue that AB 2223 is
unnecessary because litigation is a remedy, COAST says
"hogv1ash".
We know from personal experience that litigation
is costly and time-consuming.
It is a remedy that is out of
reach for most of the public.
Moreover, it drives the
public and developers apart, when they should be working in
partnership to build the best community possible.
4777 La Villa Marina
Marina del Rey, California 90292

101
COAST fully supports the effort to
reconcile PSA and CEQA through AB 2223.
With regard,

,John Powers,
President

Treasurer

Debra T_,. Bov1en,
Counsel
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Hon. Marian Bergeson
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to resolving the
Your briefing paper suggests three [X)ssible
heretofore ambiguous relationship ~:tween tne California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) and tne Permit Streamlining Act, (PSA): requiring
CEQA to be completed first, requiring adherence to the same deadlines,
or tolling the deadlines until all local legislative decisions
pertaining to the applicat.ion are completed. ~ original request to
Assemblywoman Noore basically supported the first of these
alternatives, and I still feel it addresses the issue at hand most
directly.
In my request to Assembl jl'NCman Moore, I suggested a simple concept:
complete the CEQA review and certification prior to confirmation of
"deemed approved" status under tnP PSA. This would allow for
simultaneous rLmning of the CEQA and PSA clocks (not sequential
running, as some critics feared the prorusal implied), and prompt
issuance of the automatic permit approvals if the PSA deadlines had
expired by the time the CEQA review was ccrnpleted. I believe there is
still validity in this interpretation of my proposal and AB 2223, as
approved by the Assembly, appears to be consistent with it.
Argume.nts that m:mdatory CEQA compliance prior to imposition of the PSA
provide an opporbmi ty for local jurisdictions to abuse the PSA could
be addressed rather straightforwardly, but such ru~ approach is not
without drawbacks. By combining CEQA compliance with some absolute
Cleadljncs for completion of the CEQA process and the threat of "deemed
certification," an element. of certainty could be injected into the
concept. For example, one russible approach vvould be to impose PSA's
90-day extension limit on CEQA compliance, with an
certification tmder CEQA to follow failure to compJete separate CEQA
certification within the 15-month period. This vvould then coincide
th issuance of the autor!lc>tic pennit approval under PSI•,.
Hcwever, this would essf:ntially formalize (and codify) the type of
situation that gave rise to the legislation before you, i.n which the
City fai1ed to ccrnplete its environmental review of a contxoversial
development. Luckily, this particuJar project was in the Coastal Zone,
so there was another agency (the Coastal Carnmission) effiFDWered to
provide furtner scrutiny.
The basic proble..m with absolute deadlines for CEQA review j s that
schedules should not take precedence over protection of the environment.
Court decisions regarding the PSA have left the resolution of these
issues to the legislative process you have undertaken. I do not
believe that CCliT'mtmi ty interests or developnent interests are well
served by the current art1biguous situation. Developers are not provided
sufficient certainty of process and protection against costly
1itiqation, and camnmities have little recourse except litigation over
procedural issues which should be resolved once and for all through
precise legislative action. Ad:Utionally, our overburde.ned courts can

Hon. Mariall Bergeson

Page 3

do without more potential1y fruitless litigation on procedural
that they've already suggested are most
hundled
legislative process.
AB 2223 should be approved retaining
first altE:n1ative outlined in
tht· briefing paper. Its passage will pennit disputes over developnent
proposals such as 6 01 Ocean Front Walk to focus on the merits of the
proposals. That i~: where the focus belongs. I hope you will move this
legislation forward in that positive spirit, to the benefit of all
concerned.
Thank you for considering my views.

~~
/ ) /7 -,;}-·
1~L-"t:0 (_{) at:~k_;
RlJTH GAIAJ\1TER

Councilwoman,

RG/jes
cc:

Hon. ONen Moore
Frank Eberhard

District

a
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FRIENDS OF WESTWOOD, INC.
A Nonprofit Tax-Exempt Corporation

December 16, 1991
Senate Subcommittee on Local Government
Room 112, State Capital
sacramento, Calif,
94248~0001
Re:

Assembly Bill 2223 (Moore), Permit Streamlining Act
Issues

Honorable Members of the Local Government Senate
Subcomm!tte,
Friends of Westwood is a Los Angeles based non profit
organization concerned with land issues especially as they
apply to the general Westwood community. The organization
is comprised of approximately 500-700 households.
Friends of Westwood supports the above referenced proposed
legislation.
Implementation of the proposed legislation
will allow full disclosure of facts contained within
environmental documentation, especially an EIR, prior to
discretionary permits being granted.
This will permit a
much more informed decision making process.
Additionally,
it will allow increased possibilities for an informed public
and its participation in the decision making process.
Friends of Westwood has always advocated measures which will
further an informed and actlve public.

1015 Gayley Ave., Suite 1063. LA., CA 90024

**

475-6261

